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Abstract
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Infrastructure improvements boosted growth in 
the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) by one percentage point per capita per 
year during 1995–2005, primarily thanks to growth in 
information and communication technology. Deficient 
power infrastructure held growth back by 0.1 percent. 
Raising the region’s infrastructure to the level of 
Mauritius could boost growth by 5 percentage points. 
   Overall, infrastructure in the 15 ECOWAS countries 
ranks consistently behind southern Africa across many 
indicators. However, there is parity in access to household 
services—water, sanitation, and power. 
   ECOWAS has a well-developed regional road network, 
though sea corridors and ports need attention. Surface 
transport is expensive and slow, owing to cartelization, 
restrictive regulations, and delays. There is no regional 
rail network. Air transport has improved despite the lack 
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of a strong hub-and-spoke structure. Safety remains a 
concern. Electrical power, the most expensive and least 
reliable in Africa, reaches 50 percent of the population 
but meets just 30 percent of demand. Regional power 
trading would bring substantial benefits if Guinea could 
become a hydropower exporter. Prices for critical ICT 
services are relatively high. Recent panregional initiatives 
have improved roaming. New projects are underway to 
provide access and improved services to unconnected 
countries.
   Completing and maintaining ECOWAS’s infrastructure 
will require sustained spending of $1.5 billion annually 
for a decade, with one-third going to power. Although 
the necessary spending is only 1 percent of regional GDP, 
some countries’ share is between 5 and 25 percent of 
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This paper draws on contributions from sector specialists from the Africa Infrastructure Country 
Diagnostic Team; notably, Heinrich Bofinger on air transport, Michael Minges on information and 
communication technologies, and Alvaro Federico Barra on spatial analysis. 
The paper is based on data collected by local consultants and benefited greatly from feedback 
provided by colleagues in the relevant World Bank teams; notably Yusupha Crookes (director of the 
Africa Regional Integration Department), Andrew Roberts (Africa Regional Integration Department), 
Gael Raballand (transport), and Charles Kunaka (International Trade Department). The paper benefited 
from feedback provided by REC staff at a May 2010 Workshop organized by the Infrastructure  
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This paper draws on contributions from sector specialists from the Africa Infrastructure Country 
Diagnostic Team; notably, Heinrich Bofinger on air transport, Michael Minges on information and 
communication technologies, and Alvaro Federico Barra on spatial analysis. 
The paper is based on data collected by local consultants and benefited greatly from feedback 
provided by colleagues in the relevant World Bank teams; notably Yusupha Crookes (director of the 
Africa Regional Integration Department), Andrew Roberts (Africa Regional Integration Department), 
Gael Raballand (transport), and Charles Kunaka (International Trade Department). The paper benefited 
from feedback provided by REC staff at a May 2010 Workshop organized by the Infrastructure  
Consortium for Africa in Tunis and at other meetings. 
  
Synopsis 
Sound infrastructure is a critical determinant of growth in West Africa. Over the period 1995–2005, 
infrastructure improvements have boosted West Africa‘s growth by one percentage point per capita per 
year. This positive growth effect has come almost entirely from the ICT revolution, while deficient power 
infrastructure has held economic growth back by 0.1 percentage point per capita per year. If West 
Africa‘s infrastructure could be improved to the level of the strongest performing country in Africa 
(Mauritius), regional growth performance would be boosted by some 5 percentage points. 
Infrastructure in the 15 countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
ranks consistently behind Southern Africa across a range of infrastructure indicators. However, in some 
areas such as access to household services—water, sanitation, and power—the differences between 
ECOWAS and the leading region, SADC, are not significant. On the other hand, the gaps with respect to 
electricity generation capacity, as well as road and telephone density, are much more substantial.  
The difficult economic geography of the ECOWAS region makes it particularly important to take a 
regional approach to infrastructure development. ECOWAS is characterized by small-scale economies, 
many of which are physically cut off from key resources. Eight member states have populations of less 
than 10 million people, and 11 ECOWAS member states have a gross domestic product (GDP) of less 
than $5 billion. The small size of these economies prevents the capture of scale economies in 
infrastructure development, making it difficult for governments to afford the high fixed costs associated 
with infrastructure development. Three of the ECOWAS member states are landlocked and rely on the 
infrastructure of neighbors for access to critical markets. The region is also characterized by a number of 
international rivers; perhaps most notably the Niger, the catchment of which spans seven member 
countries. Regional approaches are critical to developing transport and hydraulic infrastructure that are 
essentially regional public goods. 
ECOWAS has a relatively well developed regional road network based on seven main arteries, but 
coastal countries are not devoting enough attention to sea corridors. Five of these regional road arteries 
are sea corridors for the three landlocked countries; they provide each of these countries with more than 
one route to the sea. In addition, there are two corridors—one coastal, one Sahelian—that are important 
for intraregional trade. These key road corridors have already been almost entirely paved, and the greater 
part of them are in good or fair condition. Interestingly, the main quality problems found on these 
regional networks arise on the up-country portions of sea corridors located in the coastal countries. 
Essentially, these portions of road are of limited importance to the national economy, hence maintenance 
may be neglected even though they are absolutely critical to the landlocked country in the hinterland. 
Ironically, these are typically the most heavily used portions of the regional network, and yet they are in 
the worst condition. The other weak point in ECOWAS‘s regional road network is the coastal corridor 
between Abidjan and Dakar. where conflict in a number of countries has led to extensive deterioration of 
the coastal route. 
Surface transport in West Africa is very expensive compared with the rest of Africa and the 
developing world. The causes are cartelization and restrictive regulation of the trucking industry. In West ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Africa, road transport tariffs are on the order of $0.08 per tonne-kilometer, compared with $0.05 per 
tonne-kilometer in southern Africa and well below $0.04 per tonne-kilometer in much of the rest of the 
developing world. High freight charges do not reflect high transport costs so much as high trucking 
profits that can be traced to the lack of competition in the industry. In addition, the tour de rôle regulatory 
framework is based on market sharing and centralized allocation of freight, which limits vehicle mileage 
and undermines incentives for investing to improve service quality. 
Surface transport in West Africa is also very slow compared with the rest of Africa and the 
developing world, because of frequent delays associated with administrative processes. The average 
effective velocity of road freight movements in West Africa is around 6 miles per hour, or about half the 
effective velocity of 11 miles per hour found in southern Africa. In both cases, however, freight is moving 
no faster than a horse and buggy. This slow speed has little to do with road infrastructure—which is 
generally of reasonable quality—and much to do with administrative barriers such as border and customs 
clearance, as well as formal and informal checkpoints and road blocks that keep trucks stationary for 
extended periods of time. 
The overall times and cost of moving goods along West Africa’s key trade routes is time-consuming 
and expensive—requiring on the order of 400–1,000 hours of time and costing between $175 and $310 
per tonne. Port delays and administrative charges account for the lion‘s share of the time. The high costs 
reflect the high transport costs in the region and the inefficiency of many ports. Random checkpoints, 
bribery, and police inspections add more to the time and cost of moving freight. 
There is no real regional rail network in the ECOWAS area. Existing lines are lightly used, and the 
presence of three different rail gauges complicates integration. The national rail networks of ECOWAS‘s 
member states are mostly independent from each other, with the exception of two relatively successful 
binational rail corridors. This situation is in contrast to Southern Africa, where interconnected national 
railway systems form a regional railway network that spans half a dozen countries. Further integration of 
West Africa‘s rail systems is technically complicated by the presence of three different gauges across the 
region. Given the poor performance and relatively light use of existing rail networks, the economic case 
for integration is also far from clear. The more pressing priority is to improve the performance of national 
systems to allow them to compete more effectively with road transport. 
In the ports sector, West Africa lacks a clear maritime hub as the center for a more effective 
transshipment network and needs to improve performance across the board. The performance of West 
African ports does not compare favorably with ports elsewhere in Africa and is well behind global best 
practice. Services can easily cost twice global benchmarks, while productivity is around half the global 
mark; delays can be several times as long. At present, West Africa lacks a clear regional hub for 
transshipment. Prior to the conflict in Côte d‘Ivoire, Abidjan had begun to play this role, but at present 
major shipping lines serve West Africa via North Africa or even southern Spain. The creation of a West 
African hub would facilitate the consolidation of sea freight for the region. 
On air transport, ECOWAS has made great strides on market liberalization, but safety remains a 
concern, and the region lacks a strong hub-and-spoke structure. West Africa is more advanced than most 
regions in the implementation of the Yamassoukro Decision. Market liberalization has substantially 
altered regional air traffic patterns (and fueled a huge expansion of domestic air transport in Nigeria). ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Entrance of new carriers has helped to reverse the market collapse that followed the demise of major flag 
carriers, particularly in the countries of the Banjul Accord Group, though not so much in the West African 
Economic Monetary Union. However, liberalization also seems to have contributed to a decline in air 
traffic safety. Numerous countries in the region need to strengthen their civil aviation authorities, and it 
may be that a regional approach would help to pool scarce human resources and enhance regulatory 
independence. As in the sea ports sector, there is a marked absence of a strong regional hub for air 
transport, particularly compared with eastern and southern Africa, where strong hubs have evolved—
notably Addis Ababa, Johannesburg, and Nairobi.  
Power supply in the ECOWAS region is the most expensive and least reliable in Africa. With 50 
percent of its population electrified, West Africa is ahead of other regions on power access. Yet 
generation capacity is very limited, and power supply is highly unreliable, with 30 percent of existing 
power demand unmet and widespread outages. Moreover, average historic costs of power in the region 
have been high—on the order of $0.20 per kilowatt-hour. With power demand likely to triple over the 
next decade, expanding power supply infrastructure is critical to the region‘s economic future. 
West Africa already practices regional power trade. Further pursuit of such trade could bring 
substantial benefits, but much depends on Guinea’s ability to become a hydropower exporter. The 
principle of regional power exchange is already well-established thanks to the efforts of the West Africa 
Power Pool, even if the actual volumes of power traded remain small. In the future, there is the potential 
to develop trade much further, to the point that many countries in the region could be better off by 
importing more than half of their power needs. Doing so would bring numerous advantages. The region‘s 
cost of energy would be reduced by $435 million annually (or around 3 percent). Most countries would 
save significantly on their national power development costs and a number of smaller countries could 
substantially reduce their long-run marginal cost of power. In addition, regional trade would allow a shift 
to cleaner energy that would reduce regional carbon emissions by 5 million tonnes annually. Overall, the 
returns on investments in regional interconnection yield an average rate of return of 33 percent. However, 
most of these benefits hinge on the development of 3,700 megawatts of cost-effective hydropower in 
Guinea, where a host of technical, financial, and political challenges make this a difficult prospect.  
Compared with other regional economic communities in Africa, ECOWAS performs relatively well on 
access to information and communication technologies (ICTs) but faces relatively high prices for critical 
services. Thanks to the emergence of a number of pan-regional operators, as well as intensive 
collaboration among telecommunications regulators, the region is very advanced with respect to regional 
roaming arrangements. Despite the presence of submarine cables along the coast, however, many 
countries remain unconnected, and many of those with access fail to benefit fully owing to monopoly 
control of the international gateway. A number of new projects are underway, with plans for several 
unserved countries to connect to the new cables. Creating competition between landing stations will be 
critical to providing affordable service. In order for the benefits of submarine access to spread within the 
region, it will be important to complete the 1,900 missing kilometers of terrestrial fiber optic network. 
Associated investments are small and anticipated returns from reducing the price of broadband access 
relatively high, with payback periods of less than a year. 
Completing and preserving ECOWAS’s regional ICT, power and transport backbones would require 
sustained spending of $1.5 billion annually over the course of a decade. This is about 10 percent of the ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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overall infrastructure spending requirements (regional and national) for the ECOWAS region as a whole. 
Of the total $1.5 billion, around a billion a year is associated with investment in the creation of new 
regional infrastructure assets, while the balance of $0.5 billion is needed to maintain the regional network 
in perpetuity once established, most of it associated with road maintenance. By far the largest item in the 
regional spending requirement is the power sector, with specifically regional power assets demanding $1 
billion per year over the next decade. The transport sector comes in second place with an annual spending 
requirement of $0.4 billion. 
The amounts that would have to be spent to meet regional requirements across all infrastructure 
sectors represent only 1 percent of regional GDP, but for some small countries the burden is 
insurmountable. The total regional spending requirement of $1.5 billion represents less than 1 percent of 
the regional GDP of $176 billion. In absolute terms, by far the largest burden falls on Guinea, which 
would have to spend $0.9 billion a year over the next decade to deliver the infrastructure assets (chiefly 
power) needed by the region. Nigeria comes in a distant second, with a spending requirement of $0.2 
billion a year (also largely associated with power). If one looks at regional spending requirements relative 
to the size of each country‘s economy, the burden appears even more uneven. Guinea‘s regional spending 
requirement, in particular, translates to more than 25 percent of GDP, manifestly beyond what the 
national economy could plausibly deliver without external assistance. Another group of countries—The 
Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia—would need to spend around 5 percent of their GDP on regional 
spending requirements—a huge stretch, even if the absolute sums involved (no more than $20–30 million 
a year) do not look so large. 
 ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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1    Introduction 
The Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) has conducted extensive data collection and 
analysis of infrastructure in Africa, including the 15 countries of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS). The results have been presented in a variety of continental reports covering 
different areas of infrastructure—information and communication technology (ICT), irrigation, power, 
transport, and water and sanitation—and different policy areas—including investment needs, fiscal costs, 
and sector performance. 
The purpose of this regional report is to present the key AICD findings for the ECOWAS community. 
The main value in doing so is that it makes it possible to benchmark the infrastructure situation in the 
region against that of other African peers, to identify the main gaps in the regional infrastructure 
backbones, and to quantify the costs and benefits of regional integration, as well as their distribution 
across member states.  
A number of methodological issues should be borne in mind.  
First, owing to the cross-country nature of the data collection, there is inevitably a time lag in the 
data. The period covered by AICD runs from 2001 to 2006. Most of the technical data presented are for 
2006 (or the most recent year available), while financial data are typically averaged over the available 
period to smooth out the effect of short-term fluctuations. Given the fast pace of regional integration, the 
snapshot presented here does not necessarily correspond to today‘s situation but rather represents the 
2006 baseline against which subsequent progress can be measured. 
Second, given the need to make comparisons across countries, indicators and analysis had to be 
standardized and made consistent. That means that some of the indicators may be slightly different from 
those routinely reported and discussed at the country level.  
Third, the database on which the analysis is based was designed to give a national and continental 
picture of infrastructure, as opposed to an explicitly regional picture. But national infrastructure provides 
the basic building blocks for regional integration, and hence can be used to build up a picture of the 
regional situation. Nevertheless, some specifically regional issues—particularly of the regulatory and 
institutional variety—may not have been explicitly addressed in the national data collection effort. 
Fourth, while water resource management is an important aspect of regional integration in Africa, this 
report does not explore water resource issues. The reason is that the AICD project did not cover water 
resources per se, but rather the specific water resource needs associated with the power, irrigation, and 
water supply sectors. 
Why infrastructure matters 
ICT infrastructure has made a significant contribution to growth performance in ECOWAS. The 
regional group has 15 member states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d‘Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. For the period ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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2003–08, all countries of the group experienced economic growth, although the averages varied by 
country. Overall, ECOWAS countries grew at a rate of 5 percent during the period, and infrastructure 
contributed one percentage point to that growth. As in other regions of Africa, most of that growth can be 
traced to the introduction of mobile telephony (figure 1.1a). At the same time, deficient power 
infrastructure held back economic growth in West Africa by 0.1 percentage point per capita per year.  
Figure1.1a  Infrastructure’s contribution to economic growth, 1995–2005 




















































































































































































































Source: Calderon 2008. 
However, infrastructure could potentially contribute much more to economic growth than it has in the 
past (figure 1.1b). Simulations suggest that if West Africa‘s infrastructure could be upgraded to the level 
of the best-performing country in Africa (Mauritius), the impact on per capita economic growth would be 
on the order of 5 percent. While all areas of infrastructure—ICT, power, water, and transport—need to be 
upgraded, improvements in power could affect growth by more than 2.5 percent. 
Why regional integration matters 
With its large number of small, isolated economies, ECOWAS‘s economic geography is particularly 
challenging. Of the 15 member countries, three are landlocked, 8 have fewer than 10 million people, 11 
have a gross domestic product (GDP) of less than $5 billion per year, and 6 rely on transnational river ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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basins for their water resources (figure 1.2a). In addition, 4 countries have recently emerged from conflict 
that has severely damaged their national infrastructure networks. Economic activity in the region is most 
intense in certain urban pockets along the coast, as well as in northern and central Nigeria, where GDP 
exceeds $1 billion per hundred square kilometers. Economic density tails off steadily as one moves inland 
and north, reaching a low point of less than $10 million per 100 square kilometers in the Sahel region 
(figure 1.2b). 
Regional integration is likely the only way to overcome these handicaps and to allow ECOWAS 
member states to participate in the global economy. Integrating physical infrastructure is both a precursor 
to and enabler of deeper economic integration, thereby allowing countries to gain scale economies and 
harness regional public goods. Infrastructure sharing addresses problems of small scale and adverse 
location. Joint provision increases the scale of infrastructure construction, operation, and maintenance. 
Economies of scale are particularly important in the power and ICT sectors. Big hydropower projects that 
would not be economically viable for a single country make sense when neighbors share their benefits. 
Connecting countries through the undersea cable or satellite communications requires large up-front 
investments that require a regional approach.  
As well as assessing the current state of regional infrastructure, this report identifies the basic 
infrastructure needed to provide minimum interconnection of transport, power and ICT grids. This level 
of interconnection would ensure: smooth land corridor transportation between landlocked countries and 
ports, as well as between major cities for internal trade; rational development of power supply options 
harnessing cost-effective generation technologies at efficient scale in the context of a regional trading 
pool; and fiber optic access to submarine cables through a robust communications network inter-linking 
capital cities. The missing physical links that currently hold back this degree of integration will be 
identified throughout the report, and detailed cost estimates presented in the final section. ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Figure 1.2a  Topographical profile of the ECOWAS region 
 
Source: AICD. 
The state of ECOWAS’s infrastructure  
ECOWAS‘s infrastructure ranks consistently behind the Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC) on all aggregate infrastructure indicators (table 1.1). However, in some areas such as access to 
improved sources of water and sanitation, as well as electricity, the differences between ECOWAS and 
the SADC—the Sub-Saharan leader—are not significant. On the other hand, the gaps with respect to 
electricity generation capacity, road density, and telephone density are much more substantial. The 
aggregates for ECOWAS as a whole inevitably mask substantial country variations within the region.  
The following sections of the report review the main achievements and challenges with respect to the 
regional integration process for each of the main network infrastructures, as well as the benefits that 
regional integration promises in each case. Table 1.2 summarizes the main findings of this sectoral 
review. The final section of the paper presents the overall financial costs of implementing the regional 
integration agenda and assesses the affordability of this venture for the region. 
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Table 1.1  Benchmarking ECOWAS with other economic communities 
   ECOWAS  EAC  SADC  Central 
Paved road density   38  29  92  4 
Mainline density   28  6  80  13 
Mobile density   72  46  133  84 
Internet density   2  2  4  1 
Generation capacity   31  16  176  47 
Electricity coverage   18  6  24  21 
Improved water   63  71  68  53 
Improved sanitation   35  42  46  28 
Source: AICD. 




Table 1.2  Progress and challenges for regional integration in ECOWAS 
Sector  Achievements  Challenges  Promise of regional integration 
Road  
transport 
Several major international 
gateways in West Africa that 
facilitate trade. 
High trucking charges and lengthy 
delays due to trade facilitation issues. 
Coastal countries appear to neglect 
maintenance of regional corridors.  
Reducing costs and delays associated with 
surface transport of goods in the region.  Railways  Two relatively successful 
binational concessions  
Low levels of passenger and freight 
traffic, poor operational performance of 
railways. Railways facing stiff 
competition from other modes of 
transport. Incompatible rail gauges. 
Ports  Burgeoning container and 
general cargo traffic. 
Poor operational performance and 
absence of a transshipment hub.  
Air  
transport 
Reasonable levels of 
interregional connectivity.  
WAEMU and BAG are most 
liberalized markets in Africa. 
Low levels of connectivity within 
ECOWAS.  
Lack of a strong regional hub. 
Aging fleet and poor record with 
respect to air traffic safety.  
Collaborating on improvement of safety record. 
Improving efficiency of regional air transport 
through better hub system. 
Power 
High electrification rates.  
Cost recovery is better than 
in other regions.  
Principle of regional trade 
already well established. 
Lack of generation capacity leads to 
unreliable service, with only 70 percent 
of demand being satisfied.  
Utilities highly inefficient with regard to 
distribution losses and revenue 
collection. 
Deepening regional integration would save the 
WAPP area $435 million in annual energy 
costs, and annual savings in carbon emissions 
of some five million tonnes of carbon. Long-run 
marginal cost of power in the WAPP would fall 
by $0.01 per kilowatt-hour or 5 percent. Overall 
rate of return on regional integration 
investments is 33 percent. 
ICT 
Access to ICT services 
among highest in Africa.  
Significantly cheaper to call 
on landline within ECOWAS 
than outside the region.  
Roaming arrangements 
relatively advanced.  
Associated regional telecom 
regulators have been active 




Relatively high prices for ICT services.  
Many countries not connected to the 
submarine cable.  
Even those connected face high costs 
due to lack of competition on 
international gateways.  
Achieving regional integration of ICT will cost 
only $5.1 million annually, and bring benefits of 
$ 115 million annually, a return of more than 
400 percent. Benefits derive primarily from 
lower prices inducing higher rates of 
subscription to broadband services. The overall 
rate of return on regional integration 
investments (existing greenfield and filling of 
gaps) is 52 percent. 
Source: AICD. 
Note: BAG = Banjul Access Group; WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union; WAPP = West African Power Pool.  
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2    Transport 




Surface transport of goods in Africa is much slower and costlier than elsewhere in the developing 
world. Across the developing world, freight can typically be moved at rates of between $0.01 to $0.04 per 
tonne-kilometer. A recent study of road transport costs and prices across Africa found rates of between 
$0.05 to $0.13 per tonne-kilometer; well above the global benchmark. It also found that—despite the 
relatively good condition of the road corridors (figure 2.1a)—freight movements are astonishingly slow 
when all delays are fully taken into account; with an effective velocity of 6–12 kilometers per hour, not 




Figure 2.1b  Traffic on ECOWAS’s regional road network  
 
Source: AICD. 




Road in good 
condition (%) 
Trade density (US$ 
millions per km) 
Implicit velocity* 
(km per hour) 
Freight tariff 
(US$ per tonne-km) 
Western  2,050  72  8.2  6.0  0.08 
Central  3,280  49  4.2  6.1  0.13 
Eastern  2,845  82  5.7  8.1  0.07 
Southern  5,000  100  27.9  11.6  0.05 
*Implicit velocity is the total distance divided by the total time taken to make the trip including time spent stationary at ports, border crossings 
and other stops 
Source: Teravaninthorn and Raballand 2008.  
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Transit corridors in West Africa perform significantly worse than those in southern and eastern 
Africa. Across the different regions of Africa, performance varies dramatically. Southern Africa is well 
ahead of the other regions, with the lowest road freight tariffs and the fastest movement of goods. But 
West Africa does not compare very favorably with the other regions, either. Road freight tariffs, at $0.08 
per tonne-kilometer, are toward the middle of the African range. The effective velocity of road transport, 
at six miles per hour, is the worst reported for any region. 
High road freight charges in West Africa can largely be explained by a cartelized trucking industry 
operating under restrictive regulations. Analysis of cost information provided by trucking firms indicates 
that the high road freight charges in the region are not attributable to higher costs, but rather to larger 
profit margins made possible by limited competition within industry cartels. Trucking industry profit 
margins in West Africa were found to be on the order of 80 percent, compared with 20–60 percent in 
southern Africa. In addition, the tour de rôle regulatory framework is based on market sharing (―taking 
turns‖) and centralized allocation of freight. This limits vehicle mileage to around 2,000 kilometers per ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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month, versus 12,000 in the developed world, and undermines incentives for investing to improve service 
quality. Hence, the truck fleet is largely composed of poorly maintained second-hand trucks that are 
typically overloaded to obtain maximum revenues from their restricted usage. There is typically excess 
supply, with too many vehicles chasing modest overall freight volumes. In southern Africa, by contrast, a 
much larger share of freight traffic is allocated through competitive bilateral contracts between clients and 
shippers. These considerations make the liberalization of the trucking industry a key measure to improve 
regional surface transportation in West Africa. Indeed, until the regulatory framework for the trucking 
industry is modernized, there will be no real economic benefit from further improvements to the quality 
of road corridors. 
The slow effective velocity of freight in West Africa can be explained in terms of numerous 
roadblocks and lengthy administrative delays at ports and border crossings. There is ample evidence of 
extensive delays at West Africa‘s land border crossings. Port processing times are also lengthy. In 
addition, a number of recent studies confirm that roadblocks (both formal and informal) are rampant on 
West Africa‘s major transit corridors. Ad hoc administrative hurdles, corruption, and other informal 
payment demands contribute to a high level of uncertainty in land transport. For example, a 2009 report 
from the U.S. International Trade Commission mentions that ―trucks in Ghana traveling from Paga (on 
the northern border with Burkina Faso) to Tema (on the Gulf of Guinea) take two to four days under 
normal conditions, but an estimated 10–20 percent of trucks are delayed by a week or more; moreover, if 
a truck breaks down on this route, it can take up to three weeks to procure a mechanic from Kumasi in 
south-central Ghana‖ (Christ and Ferrantino 2009).
  
ECOWAS‘s landlocked countries—Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger—each has more than one gateway 
to the sea, in contrast to landlocked countries in other regions of Africa (figure 2.2a). Ouagadougou 
(Burkina Faso) has access to both Tema (Ghana) and Abidjan (Côte d‘Ivoire). Bamako (Mali) has access 
to both Dakar (Senegal) and Tema (Ghana). Niamey (Niger) has access to both Cotonou (Benin) and 
Lomé (Togo). The existence of multiple corridors provides choice and helps to create competition. Some 
studies indicate that in Western Africa, average clearance time is shorter than in other parts of Africa 
(Christ and Ferrantino 2009). For example, the time from a ship‘s arrival to its clearance in Ouagadougou 
(Burkina Faso) is limited to 10–15 days, which is comparable to, or better than, ports in other parts of the 
world. The relatively good performance is due in part to the competition between ports on the Gulf of 
Guinea to capture transit trade in ports (Christ and Ferrantino 2009; Arvis, Raballand, and Marteau 2009). 
The presence of multiple gateways also diversifies risk: During the disruption caused by the recent civil 
war in Côte d‘Ivoire, Burkina Faso was able to divert traffic via Ghana.  
Two key corridors are also emerging in support of intraregional trade. ECOWAS‘s large number of 
small countries, makes for numerous borders within the region, so that trade facilitation looms large with 
respect to intraregional trade. The two key internal corridors that have emerged are the coastal corridor 
from Abidjan (Côte d‘Ivoire) to Lagos (Nigeria), and the Sahelian corridor running from Nouakchott 
(Mauritania) to N‘Djamena (Chad). The coastal corridor could in principle be extended all the way to 
Dakar (Senegal), but because so many countries along the route have just emerged from conflict, this 
corridor has not yet become a reality. 
Regional corridors are typically paved and in reasonable condition, but there is evidence that coastal 
countries may be neglecting strategic hinterland routes. ECOWAS‘s seven key regional corridors are ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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almost entirely paved, and in most cases road infrastructure is mainly in good or fair condition (table 2.2, 
figure 2.1a, figure 2.2a). More than 95 percent of the length of the key regional corridors is paved in just 
about every country along the way. In most cases, at least 80 percent of each corridor by length is in good 
or fair condition.  
Figure 2.2  ECOWAS’s seven main regional road corridors 
a. Road condition 
 
b. Traffic volumes 
 
Source: AICD. 
Note: Background show GDP per 100 square kilometers on grey scale. ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Table 2.2  Road condition along major transit corridors in ECOWAS  
  Percentage in condition 
Percentage 
Paved 
Percentage in traffic band 
Corridors  Good  Fair  Poor 
 
<300  300-1000  >1000 
GATEWAYS TO THE SEA               
Tema-Ouagadougou-Bamako  67.1  30.7  2.2  100.0  3.8  25.7  25.4 
Burkina Faso  52.4  47.6  0.0  100.0  8.3  31.0  60.7 
Ghana  62.8  32.5  4.8  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Mali   100.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  4.7  72.0  23.2 
Dakar-Bamako  48.0  19.8  32.1  100.0  24.9  55.6  19.5 
Mali  75.6  24.4  0.0  100.0  46.7  47.2  6.1 
Senegal  16.6  14.6  68.8  100.0  0.0  65.2  34.8 
Abidjan-Ouagadougou  33.1  23.0  43.9  100.0  3.5  23.3  73.1 
Burkina Faso  68.6  27.3  4.1  100.0  4.1  27.6  68.3 
Côte d'Ivoire  3.1  19.5  77.5  100.0  3.1  19.7  77.2 
Lomé-Niamey  50.2  30.1  19.8  100.0  0.0  82.6  17.4 
Burkina Faso  35.4  38.9  25.8  100.0  0.0  77.3  22.7 
Niger  99.0  1.0  0.0  100.0  0.0  100.0  0.0 
Togo  51.7  0.0  48.3  100.0  0.0  37.2  62.8 
Cotonou-Niamey  49.5  7.9  42.6  98.5  1.5  26.4  70.0 
Benin  38.1  2.2  59.7  97.8  2.2  15.8  81.5 
Niger  77.7  22.3  0.0  100.0  0.0  52.8  41.4 
INTRA-REGIONAL CORRIDORS               
Abidjan-Lagos  50.7  28.0  20.6  98.8  0.0  0.4  43.6 
Benin  26.9  0.0  68.0  92.4  0.0  2.5  90.3 
Côte d'Ivoire  0.0  100.0  0.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  100.0 
Ghana  75.0  14.5  10.5  100.0  -  -  - 
Nigeria  50.0  50.0  0.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  100.0 
Togo  0.0  0.0  100.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  100.0 
Nouakchott-Ndjamena  63.4  21.1  10.2  97.3  9.9  46.2  43.4 
Burkina Faso  70.7  29.3  0.0  100.0  6.2  37.6  56.3 
Cameroon  84.8  15.2  0.0  100.0  31.0  56.5  12.5 
Mali  62.9  31.3  0.0  94.2  5.8  75.8  16.4 
Mauritania  50.6  23.8  25.6  100.0  0.0  21.5  78.5 
Niger  66.4  4.4  29.1  99.1  3.8  46.8  48.5 
Nigeria  -  -  -  100.0  0.0  0.0  100.0 
Senegal  10.9  26.5  62.6  28.6  0.0  100.0  0.0 
Source: AICD calculations. 




However, there are a few corridors where the percentage of the road in good or fair condition falls to 
the 60 to 70 percent range. These are Dakar to Bamako, Abidjan to Ouagadougou, and Cotonou to 
Niamey. What is striking in each of these cases is that the problem seems to lie in the neglect of road 
quality by the coastal gateway country. Thus, on the Dakar-to-Bamako route, 69 percent of the 
Senegalese portion is in poor condition. On the Abidjan-to-Ouagadougou route, 78 percent of the Ivorian 
portion is in poor condition. On the Cotonou-to-Niamey route, 60 percent of the Beninois portion is in 
poor condition. Clearly, the incentives for the coastal country to maintain hinterland road corridors do not 
seem to be very strong, since the coastal countries‘ economies are typically concentrated along the coast, 
making the up-country segments regional public goods. 
Traffic along the key regional corridors is moderate to heavy in both cases; with the most heavily 
used routes typically those in poorest condition. The regional corridors almost always carry at least 300 
vehicles per day along most of their length, and more than 1,000 vehicles per day on at least 20 percent of 
their length (table 2.2, figure 2.1b, figure 2.2b). Overall, the most heavily used corridors are the two 
gateways into Burkina Faso, and the Cotonou-to-Niamey route. Ironically, these are also some of the 
corridors in the worst physical condition. The Dakar-to-Bamako route is one of the most lightly used, 
perhaps reflecting the existence of a parallel rail corridor; although the Abidjan-to-Ouagadougou route is 
used intensively, despite the existence of the rail alternative. Otherwise, the portions of the corridors 
falling in the coastal countries tend to be the most heavily used, almost always attracting in excess of 
1,000 vehicles per day. Nevertheless, in absolute terms, such traffic levels can be considered no more than 
moderate. After all, 300 vehicles per day is the minimum traffic threshold required for paving to be 
economically viable. And none of the corridors exceed the threshold of 10,000 vehicles per day needed 
for toll road concessions to be economically viable. 
The cost of moving goods along each of these key arteries is a key constituent of competitiveness for 
both international and intraregional trade. These costs break down into three components: the travel costs 
of moving goods, determined by road and rail freight tariffs; the administrative costs of moving goods 
across borders and through ports, determined by associated service charges; and the costs of time delays 
incurred by waiting at roadblocks, border crossings, and ports. The competitiveness of the different 
corridors can be gauged by aggregating transport, administrative, and waiting costs incurred along the 
route. 
In the few cases where parallel road and rail corridors exist, the rail option appears to offer the 
competitive edge. There are only two railways in West Africa connecting landlocked countries to the sea: 
the Sitarail corridor linking Abidjan to Ouagadougou and the Transrail corridor linking Dakar to Bamako 
(figure 2.3). Comparative analysis of these parallel road and rail corridors suggests that the railway 
usually has the upper hand, with a cost advantage on the order of 10 to 25 percent driven largely by the 
lower freight tariffs—$0.08 per tonne-kilometer by road against just over $0.06 per tonne-kilometer by 
rail. Unless rail freight encounters additional delays owing to the disrepair of the railways or service 
disruptions, it is cheaper than road transport for transferring goods from Mali and Burkina Faso to West 
African ports. ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Source: Data collected from World Bank 2008,  West Africa Trade Hub data, World Bank project documents, and AICD ports and railways 
database. 
 
Prolonged dwell times at ports, delays in crossing borders, and customs clearance processes add 
significant amounts of time to moving imports along regional corridors from ports. There is significant 
variation across corridors in port efficiency, border crossing delays, and time required for customs, 
clearance, and technical control. The time required to move imports from ports to a landlocked country 
along the corridors takes anywhere from 400 hours (20 days) to 700 hours (48 days), close to double the 
times observed in southern Africa (figure 2.4a).  
How that time is spent varies. Owing to long distances from landlocked capitals to ports, transport 
times contribute the lion‘s share to the total for importing freight, followed by expensive administrative 
processes (figure 2.4b)
1. Other factors vary as well. For example, the Port of Lomé is far more efficient 
than the Port of Cotonou or Tema. Abidjan also records shorter delays at ports, giving the port a 
comparative advantage over its competitor ports (Teme Dakar and Lomé). Crossing West African borders 
has been described as a time-consuming ordeal. Previous estimates suggested that crossing Ghanaian 
borders took more than 20 hours (Teravaninthorn and Raballand 2008). Recent estimates for crossing the 
border between Ghana and Burkina Faso estimate the border-related delays to be between 6 and 8 hours 
(West Africa Trade Hub 2010a).. Customs processes, depending on final destination, are more expensive 
and often more time-consuming in West Africa than in southern Africa and parts of eastern Africa. In 
Niger, customs clearance processes takes up to 11 days.   
                                                 
1 The port sector appears to have improved significantly since 2006/07, when the data used for this analysis were 
collected.   ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Figure 2.4 Time required to import goods by road through alternative gateways 
a. In hours 
 
 
b. By step (% of total time) 
 
Source: Data collected from World Bank 2008,‖ West Africa Trade Hub data, World Bank project documents, and AICD ports database (ports 
data from 2006/07).  




The costs of moving freight from ports to landlocked capitals is estimated to be between $175 and 
$310 per tonne  (figure 2.5a)
2 and claim the lion‘s share of the total costs to import freight to landlocked 
countries (figure 2.5b). It costs around $310 per tonne to transport freight from Tema to Bamako or from 
Dakar to Bamako. Importing goods from Abidjan, however, is slightly cheaper ($228 per tonne) because 
the dwell times at the port are less than those at Tema and Dakar, giving Abidjan a slight competitive 
edge. The shorter average dwell time at Lomé gives it a significant edge over Cotonou, making it cheapter 
for Niger to import through Lomé than through Cotonou. In the wake of efforts to improve port efficiency 
in West Africa, delays are likely to shrink. Yet West Africa is also notorious for high costs associated 
with inspections, bribes, and other delays. Not surprisingly, long distances are linked with higher 
transport costs. 
Figure 2.5 Cost of importing goods by road through alternative gateways 
a. In U.S. dollars 
 
b. By step (% of total cost) 
 
Source: Data collected from World Bank 2008,‖ West Africa Trade hub data, World Bank project documents, and AICD ports database (ports 
data from 2006/07). 
                                                 
2 Prior research in Africa on the cost of delays was used to quantify the delays. The value was delays was estimated 
to be $5 per day per tonne. ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Evidence collected over the years points to other significant delays encountered while transporting 
imports or exports from landlocked countries to coastal countries or vice versa. These delays come in the 
form of random checkpoints. Truckers routinely pay large bribes to get past these checkpoints. The route 
between Ouagadougo to Bamako has the highest density of checkpoints, around three per 100 kilometers 
(or 30 stops along the entire route). The Malian portion of the corridor is the worst, five stops per 100 
kilometers (or 22 stops along the route). The lowest number of checkpoints per 100 km (1.8) is in Togo. 
Inspections also increase the time associated with moving along corridors. Inspections along the Tema-
Ouagadougou at the border are reportedly very long, taking around four hours in Burkina Faso and seven 
in Ghana (West Africa Trade Hub 2010). 
Reports indicate that the highest bribes are paid in Côte d‘Ivoire along the routes between Abidjan 
and Ouagadougou (1,263 kilometers) and Abidjan to Bamako (920 kilometers), the former being the 
worst among those monitored (West Africa Trade Hub 2010b).
3 Bribe payments along the Abidjan-
Ouagadougou corridor amount to $185.27, or more than $14 per 100 kilometers. More than $120 of that 
amount is paid in Côte d‘Ivoire. Similarly, drivers along the corridor from Abidjan to Bamako pay almost 
$150 in bribes, and about $95 of this total is reportedly paid in Côte d‘Ivoire. Various studies provide 
slightly different estimates for the extent of the bribery, but there is no doubt that corruption and informal 
payments impose a huge economic burden by raising costs (box 2.1). 
Box 2.1 Racketeering and bribery along the roads of Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Ghana 
A recent study by the World Bank, in coordination with the government of Côte d‘Ivoire, revealed racketeering by 
Ivorian security forces that has created serious roadblocks along the country‘s transport corridors. The roadblocks 
constitute enormous obstacles to free movement of goods and people and have caused large economic losses and 
social distress. In Abidjan, before 2008, about 70 percent of communal taxis (woroworo) and minibuses (gbaka) had 
to stay off the roads for lack of proper documents. Lack of documents often prompted racketeering.  
Apart from its negative impact on economic activity, racketeering costs transport operators in Côte d‘Ivoire between 
$230 and $363.3 million annually. Along the Abidjan-Agboville road, minibuses take 90 minutes to cover 85 
kilometers, and drivers paid $31.50 in illegal bribes to defense and security forces. The bribes collected each year by 
the authorities vary between $173.6 and $456 million for passenger transport and between $54.8 and $68.5 million 
for transport of goods. One encounters from 4 to 10 roadblocks per 100 km. Racketeering results in delays of as 
much as 30 minutes on the main highways at each checkpoint.  
The government of Cote d‘Ivoire has started a program to crack down on this problem, and results are already 
apparent (Alami 2010). 
The so-called onion corridor—the route between Burkina Faso and Ghana that is used to transport onions from 
Niger and Burkina Faso—also records high levels of bribes. Uniformed officials use the perishable nature of the 
products transported to extort money from carriers and traders. Corrupt agents realize that additional delays can 
seriously deteriorate the quality of the perishable freight. Rather than losing time at barriers, drivers pay hefty bribes 
to get through the checkpoints faster. 
Source: Alami 2008; West Africa Trade Hub 2010c. 
 
                                                 
3 Corridors monitored by the Road Harassment Initiative (a part of West Africa Trade Hub) include Tema-
Ouagadougou, Ouagadougou-Bamako, Lomé-Ouagadougou, Bamako-Dakar, Abidjan-Ouagadougou, and Abidjan-
Bamako. ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Moving along the coastal corridors is also time consuming and expensive. The Abidjan–Lagos 
corridor is the intercoastal highway that connects areas of high economic density in West Africa. While 
landlocked country gateways typically cross at most two land borders, the Abidjan–Lagos corridor passes 
through five. Freight moving along the corridor takes almost 4 days to reach Lagos from Abidjan, a 
distance of around 1,000 kilometers. The longest delays are associated with border crossings followed by 
other events such as police stops, customs, immigration, and union activity (figure 2.6).  Delays at the 
borders add over two days to the travel time. Moving freight to Lagos from Abidjan is associated with 
costs around $104 per tonne. Recent studies suggest that bribes paid along the way add over $300 per 
truck to the transport costs (West Africa Trade Hub 2010c) . 
Figure 2.6 Time required to move imports from Abidjan to Lagos 









































































b. Cost of transport and other events (U.S. dollars per tonne) 
 




In order to understand overall corridor performance, it is helpful to examine the national performance 
of the various modal components. The performance of the corridor can only be as good as the 
performance of the national transport systems of which it is comprised. To this end, the performance of 
the national road, rail and ports sectors is briefly reviewed in the remainder of the section, with a view to 
identifying national weaknesses that may have serious repercussions at the regional level. 
Roads 
Most ECOWAS countries have paved their portion of the regional network, except for a handful of 
postconflict countries. This section takes a national perspective on the regional road network. For these 
purposes, the regional road network is defined as the network needed to connect all national capitals with 
each other and with the major deep sea ports. Overall, 93 percent of this network has been paved (table 
2.3). Most ECOWAS members have made the investments necessary to pave the portions of the regional 
network that fall within their borders. The only exception to this pattern is The Gambia and postconflict 
countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, where a substantial share of the regional network remains 
unpaved. 
However, ECOWAS members vary substantially in the quality of their maintenance of the regional 
road network. Overall, 73 percent of the regional network is in good or fair condition (table 2.3). As a 
general rule, most member countries are succeeding in maintaining their portions of the regional network 
in good or fair condition. However, there are five important exceptions to this pattern. Côte d‘Ivoire, 
Senegal, Togo, Guinea, and Benin have allowed 30 to 60 percent of their regional networks to fall into 
poor condition. This may be symptomatic of wider deficiencies in the funding and implementation of road 
maintenance works in these countries, or it may denote a lack of prioritization to regional routes within 
the national road plans. Consistent with earlier findings, all of the countries with deficient maintenance 
are located on the coast. 
Table 2.3  Condition of ECOWAS regional road network by member country 
Percent 
   Condition  Type 
   Good  Fair  Poor  Unknown  Paved  Unpaved  Unknown 
Benin  35.8  1.8  61.5  1  96.8  3.2  0.0 
Burkina Faso  58.2  33.6  8.2  0  100.0  0.0  0.0 
Côte d'Ivoire  16.1  47.1  35.4  1  90.3  9.7  0.0 
Gambia  0.0  89.4  10.6  0  47.4  34.4  18.2 
Ghana  70.3  23.6  6.1  0  100.0  0.0  0.0 
Guinea  22.2  20.7  57.1  0  89.1  10.9  0.0 
Guinea-Bissau  0.0  0.0  0.0  100  0.0  0.0  100.0 
Liberia  39.4  55.9  2.7  2.1  47.5  52.5  0.0 
Mali  66.6  21.7  0.0  11.7  99.6  0.4  0.0 
Niger  31.2  31.0  0.0  37.7  88.0  12.0  0.0 
Nigeria  55.6  29.7  14.7  0  100.0  0.0  0.0 ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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   Condition  Type 
   Good  Fair  Poor  Unknown  Paved  Unpaved  Unknown 
Senegal  39.8  15.1  45.1  0.0  99.8  0.2  0.0 
Sierra Leone  19.5  58.4  22.1  0.0  33.6  66.4  0.0 
Togo  49.7  0.0  50.3  0.0  100.0  0.0  0.0 
ECOWAS  45.1  28.4  22.5  4.0  92.5  7.4  0.1 
Source: AICD various sources 
Railways 
Unlike the situation in southern Africa, there is no real regional rail network in the ECOWAS area, 
nor are the rail gauges internally compatible. In fact, the national rail networks of ECOWAS‘s member 
states are mostly disconnected from each other. This is in contrast to southern Africa, where 
interconnected national railway systems form a regional railway network that spans half a dozen countries 
and extends from the southern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo all the way to Durban in 
South Africa. Further integration of West Africa‘s rail systems is complicated by the presence of multiple 
rail gauges. Ghana and Nigeria have the Cape gauge (1,067 millimeters in width). Most of the 
francophone countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d‘Ivoire, Mali, Senegal, and Togo) operate the meter 
gauge (1,000 millimeters in width). Guinea and Liberia use the standard gauge (1,435 millimeters in 
width). 
The case for further regional integration of railway networks is constrained by the relatively limited 
usage of existing lines. Rail traffic density in West Africa is only a fraction of that found in southern 
Africa and North Africa (figure 2.7). With the exception of Ghana Railways Corporation (GRC), most of 
West African railways are serving well under one million traffic units per year. (The Nigeria Railways 
Corporation could potentially serve a much higher volume of traffic than it does today, but it has suffered 
long-term decline due to neglect and substandard performance.) By global standards, these levels of 
traffic are little more than what might be carried by a moderately busy branch line. Moreover, such low 
traffic volumes do not generate the revenue needed to finance track rehabilitation and upgrading. Under 
these market conditions, and given the technical incompatibilities, the case for further integration of 
railway networks is quite limited. 
Before contemplating further extensions to the rail network, a turnaround in the performance of 
existing railways is sorely needed to regain competitiveness with road transport. The poor quality of 
service provided by West Africa‘s railways makes it increasingly difficult for them to compete with road 
transportation. Most railways in West Africa operate at the standard at which they were originally built 
and now face major problems with competing modes of transport. West African tracks can accommodate 
relatively lightweight and slow-moving trains. Poor maintenance over extended periods of time has 
caused the deterioration of many sections of the track beyond repair and resulted in a loss of 
competitiveness and rolling-stock productivity. While such inefficiencies can be tolerated on low-volume 
feeder lines and may be the only way some can be viably operated, they are a major handicap when 




 Passenger rail services are proving too slow 
and irregular to compete with intercity buses. For 
example, between Ouagadougou and Bobo 
Diassollou in Burkina Faso, there are frequent 
buses, taking about five hours. A single train that 
runs three times a week provides service between 
these two cities, en route from Abidjan and 
Ouagadougou. By rail, the trip takes nine hours 
and is subject to frequent delays. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the bus is reported to have 95 
percent of the market between the two cities.  
Road transport is being increasingly used for 
transport of minerals more naturally suited for 
rail transportation. In Ghana, for example, 
bauxite and manganese headed to the port of 
Takoradi have been the dominant freight on GRC 
for over a decade, representing about 90 percent 
of the tonnage loaded. But most years, GRC has been unable to carry all the traffic owing to a lack of 
rolling stock (aggravated by poor infrastructure that has limited operating speeds and thus extended cycle 
times) or, as in 2008, to a strike. The traffic that could not be accommodated has gone by road at an 
additional cost of $1 per tonne for the manganese ore and even more for the bauxite. Similarly, in Niger, 
the road-rail service that was offered by OCBN was used to transport goods from Niamey to Cotonou in 
Benin. However, because of competition from road carriers, a majority of customers have abandoned the 
rail service. The share of Niger‘s containerized imports (such as petroleum products, cereals, sugar, 
sulfur) going by rail decreased from 88 percent of Niger‘s total imports in 1992 to 77 percent in 1998 and 
34 percent in 2005. Similarly, the share of Niger‘s cereal traffic going by rail dropped from 98 percent in 
1992 to 3 percent in 2005. 
West Africa does, however, have two relatively successful binational railway systems. The rail lines 
serving landlocked Mali and Burkina Faso via Senegal and Côte d‘Ivoire respectively have been 
developed as integrated operations—Transrail and Sitarail—linking the landlocked capitals to coastal 
ports. In contrast to arrangements in much of southern Africa, this configuration allows for smooth 
passage of goods across national borders and avoids the lengthy delays otherwise associated with the 
switching of locomotives as freight moves from one national network to another. The concession 
arrangements for these two railways have helped to boost operational efficiency, so that measures of labor 
and rolling stock productivity show substantially better performance than for the region‘s major publicly 
owned railways (table 2.4). 
Figure 2.7  Traffic density on African railways 
 
Source: Bullock 2009. 
Note: Density is normally expressed as traffic units per route-km. The 
traffic units carried by a railway are the sum of the passenger-km and 




















 Benin, OCBN  40  3  900  74  2.0  5.8 
 Burkina Faso – Côte d‘Ivoire, SITARAIL  481  35     1,020  3.3  5.5 
 Ghana, GRC  84  7  416  458  2.4  4.4 
 Mali – Senegal, Transrail  339  40     804  2.2  6.4 
 Nigeria, NRC  37  13  737  59  ─  ─ 
SSA average for railways under 
concession  387  24  2,945  510  2.2  6.3 
 
Legend: Labor productivity = ‗000s traffic units per employee; Locomotive productivity = millions of traffic units per locomotive; Carriage 
productivity = ‗000s passenger-kilometers per carriage; Wagon productivity = ‗000s net tonne-kilometers per wagon. 
Source: AICD railways database. 
Ports  
Container and general cargo traffic moving through West Africa‘s ports increased substantially 
between 1995 and 2005. The annual average growth in container traffic was even higher than in other 
parts of Africa, whereas growth in general cargo, however substantial, was not as rapid as in southern 
Africa (table 2.5). Overall growth in containerized traffic growth was propelled by rapid economic growth 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, a rising tide of global trade, the privatization of ports, and the advent of modern 
container vessels. 
With the rapid expansion of traffic, a few of the region‘s ports are beginning to experience capacity 
constraints (figure 2.8). This is most notable in the case of Cotonou (Benin), where both container and 
general cargo traffic significantly exceed design capacity. The port of Tema (Ghana) is also experiencing 
capacity constraints with respect to container traffic. There is some scope for easing those constraints by 
improving the efficiency of port performance, although new investments ultimately will be required. 
Table 2.5  Growth in containerized and general cargo traffic in West African ports between 1995 and 2005 
  CONTAINER TRAFFIC  GENERAL CARGO TRAFFIC 
TEUs  Percentage  ‗000s tonnes  Percentage 








East Africa  505.1  1,395.0  +276  +10.7  13.8  38.4  +278  +10.8 
North Africa  1,637.3  5,267.9  +322  +12.4  12.3  16.5  +134  +3.0 
Southern Africa  1,356.0  3,091.8  +228  +8.6  2.7  14.5  +532  +18.2 
West Africa  1,035.4  4,082.0  +394  +14.7  23.1  61.2  +265  +10.2 
Total  4,533.8  13,836.7  +305  +11.8  52.0  130.7  +251  +9.7 
Source: Ocean Shipping Consultants Limited 2009. 




Figure 2.8  Ratio of current demand to reported capacity in West African ports 
a. General cargo   b. Container traffic 
   
Source: AICD Ports Database, 2008. 
 
The performance and charges of West African ports do not compare favorably with the rest of Africa, 
let alone with global best practice (table 2.6). Compared with global best practice, Africa‘s ports are 
expensive to use and subject to extensive delays. Southern African ports tend to perform somewhat better 
than those in other regions across a range of parameters. The services provided by West African ports 
generally cost twice as much as those in other global ports. Crane productivity in ECOWAS ports, in 
terms of containers or weight, is less than half the international benchmark. Global best practice for truck 
cycle time is one hour—it takes up to 10 hours in West African ports. The international standard for the 
time containers spend in the terminal (dwell time) is seven days or less, but in West Africa, most 
containers dwell more than two weeks. The result is terminal congestion and port inefficiencies. 
Incentives for speedier pickups might include a daily storage charge after a given number of free days and 
specific rules to prevent the dumping of empty containers at the terminal. Unlike in West Africa, most 
southern African terminals offer a given number of free days‘ storage—typically up to seven days—and 
thereafter apply a daily storage charge, sometimes on a sliding scale increasing with the number of days. 
Table 2.6  Comparative port performance across African regions  
  East Africa  Southern Africa  West Africa  Global best 
practice 
Performance         
Container dwell time (days)  5–28  4–8  11–30  <7 
Truck processing time (hours)  4–24  2–12  6–24  1 
Crane productivity (containers per hour)  8–20  8–22  7–20  20–30 
Crane productivity (tonnes per hour)  8–25  10–25  7–15  >30 
Charges         
Container handling (US$ per TEU)  135–275  110–243  100–320  80–150 
General cargo handling charge (US$ per tonne)  6–15  11–15  8–15  7–9 




Performance of individual ports in ECOWAS countries varies (tables 2.7). Ports in Nigeria and 
Ghana seem to perform significantly worse than others in terms of efficiency. Container dwell times are 
particularly high, exceeding one month in a number of cases. Abidjan (Côte d‘Ivoire), Cotonou (Benin), 
Dakar (Senegal), and Lomé (Togo) all present significantly better performance on efficiency. Container 
dwell time is as low as seven days in Dakar, putting it close to global best practice. Crane productivity in 
Lomé is 23 tonnes per hour, substantially better than elsewhere, although still short of the international 
benchmark. The ports that perform best are often those that charge the most. Container handling costs are 
well above $200 per TEU in Abidjan and Lomé, or about twice the global benchmark. General cargo 
handling is around $15 per tonne in Abidjan and Dakar, again about twice the global benchmark. 
Table 2.7  Comparative performance across West African ports  
  Abidjan  Apapa  Cotonou  Dakar  Harcourt  Lomé  Tema 
  Côte 
d‘Ivoire 
Nigeria  Benin  Senegal  Nigeria  Togo  Ghana 
Performance               
Container dwell time (days)  12  42  12  7  30  13  25 
Truck processing time (hours)  3  6  6  5  24  4  8 
Crane productivity (containers per hour)  18  12  ─  ─  ─  ─  13 
Crane productivity (tonnes per hour)  16  9  15  ─  8  23  14 
Charges               
Container handling (US$ per TEU)  260  155  180  160  ─  220  168 
General cargo handling (US$ per tonne)  14  8  9  15  8  9  10 
Source: AICD ports database. 
 
ECOWAS needs better transshipment links. Although Abidjan has enjoyed some success as a 
container transshipment center, it has suffered in recent years from internal strife and problems relating to 
the ownership of operating rights to the container terminal. It is clear that the West African coast requires 
another major transshipment center. One testament to this is that the major carriers engaged in West 
African container trade, Maersk Line and its affiliate Safmarine, now use the port of Malaga, Spain, as 
their hub for West African container trade. They relay West African cargo moving to or from Europe and 
Asia there, and handle other key trades there as well. As a general rule, transshipment traffic tends to 
become a casualty as ports reach capacity constraints, as has recently occurred in several of these hubs. 
Nigerian ports play an important role in the transshipment of liquid cargo—mainly oil. Liquid cargo 
transshipment has been concentrated around the oil exporters, with Nigeria being the largest in the 




Figure 2.9  ECOWAS’s regional airports and air traffic flows 
 
Source: AICD  
 
Viewed from a continental perspective, there is an absence of strong regional air transport hubs in the 
ECOWAS region. The map of the top 60 intracontinental routes in Africa highlights the main traffic 
patterns across the continent (figure 2.10). While none of Africa‘s Sub-Saharan airports (with the possible 
exception of Johannesburg) move enough traffic to be considered global air transport hubs, a few regional 
air transport hubs have emerged during the last decade. On the eastern and southern sides of the continent, 
strong hub-and-spoke structures are centered on Johannesburg and, to a lesser extent, in Nairobi and 
Addis Ababa. On the western side, no hub-and-spoke structure for continental air traffic can be found, 
complicating air transportation both within the ECOWAS region and between West Africa and the rest of 
the continent. 
Relative to other regions, ECOWAS has a large domestic air transport market (almost entirely 
accounted for by Nigeria), but a relatively small market for intra-African air transport (table 2.8). 
However, the number of international seats is comparatively low—only a third of those found in the 
SADC region. On average, within ECOWAS, only 8 pairs of domestic cities and 20 international city-ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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pairs are served. The connectivity is the lowest in Africa after CEMAC (Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa). The seat-kilometers flown on older aircraft is 43 percent of the total; 
significantly worse than in other regions of Africa.  
Focusing exclusively on 
the regional air transport 
market and the patterns of air 
transport within ECOWAS, a 
hub-and-spoke structure of 
sorts is more clearly visible. 
Lagos and Accra are the most 
prominent hubs, and traffic 
between these two cities 
dominates regional air traffic. 
Abidjan, Bamako, and Dakar 
constitute a secondary set of 
hubs, with a significant 
amount of traffic also 
flowing between these three 
cities. 
Table 2.8  Benchmarking air 
transport in ECOWAS and other 
parts of Sub-Saharan Africa 
   West Africa  Central Africa  East Africa  Southern Africa 
Annual seats, domestic (‗000s)  2,034  235  1,345  3,076 
Annual seats, international within SSA (‗000s)  362  187  1,196  964 
Domestic city pairs served (number)  8  4  13  17 
International city pairs served (number)  20  15  29  26 
Seat-km in old aircraft (% of total)  43  30  33  29 
Seat-km in recent aircraft (% of total)  57  70  67  71 
Domestic market Herfindahl Index  0.84  0.83  0.64  0.73 
International market Herfindahl Index  0.19  0.24  0.25  0.34 
Herfindahl Index (domestic and international)  0.21  0.30  0.27  0.42 
Source: AICD database. 
 
As of 2001, the intraregional air transport market in ECOWAS amounted to about 8 million seats. 
Capacity declined steeply to just over 6 million seats in 2004, and little if any growth up occurred until 
2007 (figure 2.11). That trend masks significant differences across two important subregions. These are 
the Banjul Accord Group (BAG)—consisting of Cape Verde, Chad, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, 
Nigeria, and Sierra Leone—and the West African Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU)—comprising 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d‘Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. While both 
subregions have faced similar challenges, they have reacted to them very differently. 
Figure 2.10  International routes within Sub-Saharan Africa for 2007 
 
Source: Bofinger 2009. ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Figure 2.11  Seats for intraregional travel within ECOWAS, BAG, and WAEMU countries 

























Source: Derived from Bofinger 2009. 
 
The WAEMU countries have sustained a continuing decline in seat capacity since the demise of their 
main carrier, Air Afrique. In 2001, the WAEMU market was double the size of the BAG market, with 
some 4 million seats. Air Afrique was the dominant carrier in the subregion, with a capacity of nearly 5 
million seats. Following its collapse in 2001 there was a major vacuum in regional air transport capacity, 
and traffic never recovered, having declined to 3 million seats by 2007 (figure 2.11a). 
By contrast, the BAG countries adjusted relatively rapidly to the collapse of their main carrier, Ghana 
Airways. As a result of their low per capita income and (in several cases) their recent experience of 
conflict, these countries tend to have relatively thin air traffic per capita, despite their high population 
densities. Up until 2001, Ghana Airways and, to a lesser extent, Nigeria Airways were dominant in the 
subregion, providing at least half of seat capacity. Following the collapse of both airlines, air connectivity 
dipped by about 20 percent between 2001 and 2004 but subsequently rebounded. By 2007 seat capacity 
had surpassed 2001 levels (figure 2.11b), driven mainly by the growth of Virgin Nigeria, flying between 
Nigeria and Ghana. In 2007, Virgin Nigeria had about 50 percent of the market in the regional 
community.  
While countries in ECOWAS have fair international connectivity, domestic connectivity is very poor. 
More than half the countries in ECOWAS have no domestic connectivity at all (table 2.9). In a few cases, ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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this state of affairs may simply reflect small size (as for The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau), but more 
generally it reflects low traffic volumes and limited purchasing power in the domestic market. Both of 
these facts make it difficult for air transport to compete with surface transport alternatives, such as long-
distance bus services. Nigeria has the second-largest domestic air market in Sub Saharan Africa, after 
South Africa, accounting for 11 percent of the overall scheduled domestic traffic.  
By and large, each country has at 
least one daily connection to one of the 
main regional hubs. What appears to be 
low connectivity may not be a problem as 
long as each country has frequent 
connections to one or more of the main 
regional hubs. Whether this is so can be 
assessed by looking at the origin-
destination matrix for the ECOWAS 
countries (table 2.10), which shows that 
all of the countries in the region indeed 
have at least seven flights per week to 
one of the main regional hubs. However, 
only two countries (Mali and Togo) have 
as many as two daily flights to their 
respective hubs. Abidjan is the main hub 
for Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and 
Togo. Dakar is the main hub for Cape 
Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali. 
Accra is the main hub for Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. While strongly connected 
to Accra, Lagos is not so strongly 
connected to the francophone hubs or to any of the other surrounding countries in the region. 
Beyond basic connectivity, it is important to evaluate the convenience and velocity of air travel. For 
some countries, most of the flights that originate from within the country are direct. To a large extent, 
flights that orginate from Ghana and Nigeria are direct, because Accra and Lagos are hubs for air travel in 
West Africa. Senegal is striking in that of the 80 flights that depart, only 59 are direct. On average, flights 
from Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, and Togo cover fewer kilometers per hour than other parts of the 
subregion (table 2.11). 
Table 2.9  International and domestic connectivity for 2007 (number 








Benin  0  19  1 
Burkina Faso  1  11  1 
Cape Verde  10  5  23 
Central African Republic  0  2  1 
Côte d'Ivoire  0  23  5 
Gambia  0  7  7 
Ghana  5  19  9 
Guinea  0  8  2 
Guinea-Bissau  0  2  1 
Liberia  0  8  1 
Mali  0  16  1 
Niger  0  8  1 
Nigeria  22  31  19 
Senegal  4  24  18 
Sierra Leone  0  8  2 
Togo   0  11  1 




Table 2.10  All flights from one week in November 2007 for ECOWAS 













































































































































Benin    5    10    5        1  1  4  3    4 
Burkina Faso  4      8    3        9  1    6    4 
Cape Verde            1              1     
Côte D'Ivoire  10  11        22  9    3  8  4  8  14  1  14 
Gambia              4    4      2  12  4   
Ghana  1  3  1  23          13      41    9  8 
Guinea        8  4        2  1    2  7     
Guinea-Bissau      1                    9     
Liberia        3  5  9  2          3    3   
Mali  1  7    4              3    18     
Niger  1  1    4            4      2     
Nigeria  3      8  2  46  2    2        5  4   
Senegal  3  6  7  14  11    7  9  1  16  2  5    4  2 
Sierra Leone        1  5  7      6      3  4     
Togo  5  4    15    4            1  2     
Source: Derived from Bofinger 2009. 
 
ECOWAS‘s air transport is considered to be among the most liberalized in Africa. In both WAEMU 
and BAG, the Yamoussoukro decision has reached a high level of implementation—and, in some cases, 
full implementation. ECOWAS has achieved the most progress in instituting free pricing, lifting capacity 
and frequency restraints, and allowing airlines to fly so-called fifth-freedom routes (table 2.12)—far 
ahead of eastern and southern Africa. A concerted policy effort lies behind that achievement, especially in 
BAG. By the same token, these countries have suffered some of the steepest declines in capacity and 
traffic. The source of the declines, or near collapse, may be the overcapacity brought about by Air 
Afrique. However, liberalization is now helping established African carriers, such as Ethiopian Airlines, 
provide essential connectivity. 
The structure of the regional air transport market has changed significantly since 2001, with an 
overall reduction in market power (table 2.13). As of 2007, the regional air transport market comprised 
three major carriers—Air Senegal, Virgin Nigeria, and Bellview Airlines—that together account for 44 
percent of the regional market. This is a complete turnaround from 2001, when the three major carriers 
were Air Afrique, Ghana Airways, and SN Brussels, which together accounted for 54 percent of the 
market. Overall, there has been a slight reduction in market concentration, with the Herfindahl index 




There is also a growing presence in the subregion of 
major carriers from East Africa. It is noticeable that 
Ethiopian Airlines and Kenya Airways are taking over some 
of the routes discontinued after the collapse of Air Afrique 
and Ghana Airways; as a result, east-west traffic is slowly 
growing. For example, Ethiopian Airlines‘ share of the 
ECOWAS air transport market doubled from 3.4 percent in 
2004 to 7.0 percent in 2007. Over the same period, Kenya 
Airways went from holding 0.2 percent of the market to 5.1 
percent. 
By contrast, European carriers have largely disappeared. 
Whereas Air France and SN Brussels together accounted for 
12.1 percent of the ECOWAS market in 2001, this share had 
dwindled to no more than 0.5 percent by 2007. Two reasons 
may account for the change. As noted, WAEMU and BAG 
are the most liberalized air zones in Africa, in terms of the 
Yamoussoukro Declaration. Yamoussoukro, however, 
applies only to Africa carriers, and to traffic within Africa. 
This could be giving African carriers the edge. Additionally, 
the market in ECOWAS is just too thin to entice many 
European carriers. 
Table 2.12  Grading of the level of the implementation of the Yamoussoukro Declaration 




Arab Maghreb Union  No implementation.  No liberalization within the AMU has been 
initiated, but the need is recognized.  1 
Banjul Accord Group 
(West Africa) 
Principles of the YD agreed upon in a 
multilateral air services agreement. 
Up to fifth freedom granted, tariffs are free, 
and capacity/frequency is open.  4 
Economic and 
Monetary Community 
of Central Africa. 
Principles of the YD agreed upon in an air 
transport program. Some minor restrictions 
remain. 
Up to fifth freedom granted, tariffs are free, 
and capacity/frequency is open. A maximum 
of two carriers per state may take part. 
5 
Common Market for 
Eastern and 
Southern Africa 
Full liberalization agreed upon (―legal Notice No. 
2‖), but application and implementation remain 
pending until a joint competition authority is 
established. 
Pending. Operators will be able to serve any 
destination (all freedoms), and tariffs and 




The EAC council issued a directive to amend 
bilateral agreements among the EAC states to 
conform with the YD. 
Air services are not liberalized, as the 






No steps taken toward implementation, although 
the civil aviation policy includes gradual 
liberalization of air services within SADC. 




The YD is fully implemented.  All freedoms, including cabotage, granted. 
Tariffs have been liberalized.  5 
 
Table 2.11  Frequency and velocity of services 






   Direct  All   
Benin   22  28  450 
Burkina Faso   22  32  361 
Cape Verde   8  9  444 
Côte d'Ivoire   70  88  463 
Gambia, The  18  27  430 
Ghana   91  92  454 
Guinea   17  24  425 
Guinea-Bissau   9  9  360 
Liberia   20  31  431 
Mali   38  38  566 
Niger   8  10  487 
Nigeria   55  65  415 
Senegal   59  80  496 
Sierra Leone   18  25  549 
Togo   17  28  346 
Source: Derived from Bofinger 2009. ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Only a few countries in 
ECOWAS have made progress 
toward achieving international 
standards in air safety, making this 
area ripe for further regional 
collaboration. In some cases, such 
as Nigeria, problems with air 
transport safety have been an 
undesirable consequence of market 
liberalization. A number of 
countries (including Senegal, 
Ghana, Côte d‘Ivoire, and Nigeria) 
have been moving toward achieving 
international standards in air safety 
oversight, but the remaining 
countries in ECOWAS are in need 
of significant development 
(figure 2.12). Additionally, only 
Nigeria and Ghana are equipped 
with air traffic control and weather information. Further regional cooperation could help to improve 
oversight and safety, through the pooling of scarce human resources and greater regulatory independence. 
About half of the ECOWAS member countries already belong to the Agence pour la Sécurité de la 
Navigation Aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar (ASECNA), which, with support from France, provides 
some measure of air traffic safety. There is scope to broaden and deepen such collaborative arrangements. 
The aging of the West African aircraft fleet is another aspect of the safety issue. In contrast to 
elsewhere in Africa, the West African fleet has aged significantly between 2001 and 2007. Across Africa, 
there has been substantial investment in new aircraft, leading to an overall renewal. This is not observed 
in West Africa, where the percentage of the fleet that is classified as ―western old‖ has increased from 36 
to 43 percent between 2001 and 2007 (figure 2.13). 
In the ECOWAS region, as well as throughout Africa, the need for new airports is not as great as the 
need for maintenance and additional capacity at existing facilities. In the case of Dakar, for example, calls 
for a new airport miss the point that a parallel taxiway could alleviate many of the runway constraints. In 
addition, a more efficient regional system could be envisioned if Lagos, for example, were turned into a 
regional hub, with turbo-prop flights into neighboring countries. Any such plans would most likely have 
to include substantial investment in terminal capacity. 
 
Table 2.13  Evolution of market share of major regional carriers (%) 
Airline  Share 2001  Share 2004  Share 2007 
Air Senegal International  5.6  20.9  21.8 
Virgin Nigeria (replaces Nigerian Airways)      11.5 
Bellview Airlines Ltd.  1.7  9.8  10.8 
Société Nouvelle Air Ivoire    10.7  8.8 
Air Burkina  2.6  9.4  7.5 
Slok Air International      7.4 
Ethiopian Airlines Enterprise  3.9  3.4  7.0 
Kenya Airways  0.1  0.2  5.1 
SN Brussels Airlines  7.3    0.3 
Air France  4.8    0.2 
Air Afrique  32.0     
Ghana Airways Corp.  14.8  15.0   
Cameroon Airlines  1.4  5.4   
Market concentration measures       
Concentration top 3   54.1  41.4  44.1 
Herfindahl index  13.8  10.0  9.9 ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Figure 2.12  Status of African safety oversight, using several criteria 
 
Source: Bofinger 2009. 
 
Figure 2.13  Age distribution of airline fleet in ECOWAS, 2001 and 2007  
   
Source: Derived from Bofinger 2009. 
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Figure 2.14  Size distribfution of airline fleet in the ECOWAS region 
   
Source: Derived from Bofinger 2009. 
 
ECOWAS needs a central air transport hub that can lift aircraft load factors for regional travel toward 
sustainable levels. Further rationalization of the air transport market for the region around a single hub, 
together with a transition toward a smaller fleet of commuter propeller aircraft (such as the Fokker 50 or 
ATR), could bring significant benefits by increasing the frequency of service to countries with very little 
traffic. For example, one proposal is for repeating multi-legged flights out of the central hub that could 
serve several countries in one circular route. This nascent trend is already apparent in the West African 
aircraft fleet, which has shifted markedly toward Citi jets and commuter propeller planes in recent years 
(figure 2.14). At present, however, none of the regional airports offers the terminal facilities and 
equipment needed to act as a hub, and, as noted, significant investments would be needed to make this a 
reality. 
Airport charges in the ECOWAS region are high by international standards. Charges at Fraport in 
Frankfurt provide a commonly used international benchmark (figure 2.15). As the graph shows, the 
average charges at African airports are 30 to 40 percent higher than Fraport‘s charges. After adjusting for 
the outliers (Cameroon, Côte d‘Ivoire, and Ghana), they are 29 percent higher. Anecdotal evidence is now 
emerging that a number of countries in West Africa are charging much higher passenger fees than 




Figure 2.15  Airport charges overall by aircraft type for 18 sample airports 
 
Source: Derived from Bofinger 2009. 
Note: Fraport‘s charges for the Frankfurt am Main airport can be found at the right end. On average, the airports 
levied charges that were 30 to 40 percent higher than those sampled at Fraport for the same type aircraft. 
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3    Power 




Relative to other regional economic communities, ECOWAS performs relatively well in terms of 
electrification but falls short in terms of generation capacity, service reliability, and utility performance. 
Access to power stands at 41 percent in the ECOWAS area, substantially higher than that in other 
subregions. At 50 percent, urban access is as good as the middle-income average for Africa (table 3.1). 
However, while connections are relatively widespread in the ECOWAS area, the availability of power is 
low. Installed generation capacity per million people is less than a quarter that in the SADC region. 
Moreover, power supply is very unreliable: Outages are the highest across Africa, leading the private 
sector to invest widely in backstop generation or absorb serious losses in sales. Overall performance of 
the region‘s power utilities leaves plenty of room for improvement. The hidden costs of inefficiency—at ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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165 percent of sector revenues—are substantially higher than for the other regional economic 
communities. This is mainly attributable to very low collection rates in ECOWAS, as well as high levels 
of distribution losses. On a more positive note, the ECOWAS power utilities have the best record of cost 
recovery of any of the regional economic communities, with power tariffs covering 79 percent of the full 
capital costs of service provision. 
Table 3.1  Benchmarking power infrastructure and capacity, access and utility performance  







Installed generation capacity (MW)  3,912  583  1,085  774  9,855  2,110  36,971 
Net generation per capita, annual 
(kWh/capita/year)  171  147  114  82  1214  165  4,479 
Outages, number, annually (number/year)  165  152  119  132  91  134  71 
Outages, value lost, annually (% of sales)  7  5  7  8  2  5  2 
Firms with own generator (% of firms)  54  51  43  56  19  33  18 
 Access (urban, % of population)  50  31  34  23  35  43  50 
Growth in access of population to electricity, 
annual (%)  2  1  1  1  1  3  2 
System losses (% of generation)  29  31  32  23  12    10 
Cost recovery ratio, historical (%)  79  45  73  69  68  100  87 
Total hidden costs (% of revenue)  159  107  102  65  4  544  0 
Collection rate, reported by utility, electricity (% of 
billing)  71  93  93  94  89     91 
  WAPP  CAPP  EAPP  SAPP     
Average historic cost (US$/kWh)  0.21  0.49  0.19  0.14  ─  ─ 
Long-run marginal cost (US$/kWh)  0.18  0.09  0.12  0.07  ─  ─ 
Source: Eberhard and others 2009. 
Note: CEMAC = Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa; COMESA = Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; EAC = 
East African Community; SADC = Southern African Development Community. 
 
For the remainder of this section, attention will focus on the countries of the West Africa Power Pool 
(WAPP). This is because power sector issues in West Africa can be analyzed only in the context of this 
regional trading arrangement, within which all of the ECOWAS countries except Cape Verde exchange 
power. Similarly, the benchmarks will be the other regional power pools—the Central Africa Power Pool 
(CAPP); the East Africa Power Pool, expanded to include important trading partners in the Nile Basin, 
notably Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan (EAPP/NB); and the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP). 
The baseline total net demand for power in WAPP was 31.3 terra-watt-hours in 2005, making it the 
third-largest power market in Sub-Saharan Africa behind SAPP and EAPP/NB. Owing to widespread 
outages, power production meets just 70 percent of existing demands, by far the lowest ratio for any of 
the regional power pools. Extreme power reliability problems in Nigeria, which is able to meet only 61 
percent of its existing demand, pull down the regional average. When Nigeria is excluded, the WAPP 
countries are meeting 93 percent of existing demand, a fraction much closer to that observed in the other 
regional power pools.  ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Power demand within WAPP is expected to triple over the next decade. Taking into account the need 
to fully satisfy existing demand for power, compounded by the anticipated expansion in market demands 
driven by economic growth in commerce and industry and the need to provide additional power to 
support the planned expansion of electrification from 45 percent to 66 percent of households for the 
region, it is estimated that by 2015 power demand could reach 94.3 terawatt hours, requiring the 
development of 18,000 MW of new generation capacity—180 percent of existing capacity (table 3.2). 
These projections are based on economic growth forecasts made before the onset of the global financial 
crisis of 2008. If the economic crisis halves anticipated economic growth rates in the region, 80 percent of 
the demand reduction would occur in Nigeria (14.6 TWh) and 14 percent in Ghana. 
Table 3.2  Demand and suppressed demand for power in WAPP  
All figures are in TWh unless noted otherwise 
Country 




met in 2005 
Market demand 
2015 
Social demand with 
national targets 2015 
Total net demand 
2015 
Benin  0.6  94  0.9  0.8  1.7 
Burkina Faso  0.5  98  0.6  0.9  1.5 
Côte d‘Ivoire  2.9  88  4  1.4  5.4 
Gambia  0.1  78  0.2  0.2  0.4 
Ghana  5.9  85  10.8  2  12.8 
Guinea  0.7  76  1.3  0.8  2.2 
Guinea-Bissau  0.1  88  0.1  0.1  0.2 
Liberia  0.3  71  0.6  0.7  1.3 
Mali  0.4  95  0.6  1.2  1.8 
Mauritania  0.2  98  0.5  0.3  0.8 
Niger  0.4  98  0.6  0.7  1.2 
Nigeria  16.9  61  45.6  13.6  59.2 
Senegal  1.5  85  2.5  1  3.5 
Sierra Leone  0.2  51  0.5  0.5  1 
Togo  0.6  89  0.8  0.7  1.5 
WAPP  31.3  70  69.6  24.8  94.3 
SAPP  258.8  99  383  14  396.9 
EAPP/NB  100.6  99  144.8  24.2  169 
CAPP  10.7  92  17.1  3.1  20.2 
Island States  1.1  5  1.6  1.5  3 
Source: Rosnes and Vennemo 2009. 
Note: The East Africa Power Pool is expanded to include key Nile Basin trading partners Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. 
 
Future power demand can be met either by expanding national production or by expanding cross-
border power trade within WAPP. Two alternative scenarios will be considered here. The trade 
stagnation scenario assumes that no additional cross-border interconnectors will be built, so that trade is 
constrained at the levels observed today and countries will be obliged to meet incremental power 
demands solely through the development of their domestic power sectors. For many WAPP countries that 
lack significant energy resources of their own, this entails increased reliance on thermal generation fueled ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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by oil imports. Alternatively, under the trade expansion scenario, future regional power demand is met by 
the most cost-effective energy resources available to the region as a whole, and additional cross-border 
transmission capacity is added wherever required to allow power to flow from production to consumption 
locations. Essentially, this scenario takes regional power trade to its fullest economic potential, assuming 
that there are no restrictions to cross-border exchange and that the necessary infrastructure can be built 
wherever it is required. Reality is likely to lie somewhere in between the trade stagnation and trade 
expansion scenarios, and in this sense the two scenarios serve to frame the range of possible outcomes. 
Deepening regional integration would save the 
WAPP area $435 million in annual energy costs. Table 
3.3 compares the cost of meeting growing regional 
power demand over the next decade, depending on 
whether the trade stagnation or trade expansion 
scenario is adopted. Overall, trade expansion reduces 
the total annual cost of producing and distributing 
power from $12.7 billion to $12.3 billion, saving the 
region more than $400 million each year (see below). 
Under the trade expansion scenario, countries would 
have to make larger investments in capital-intensive 
hydropower generation of $162 million each year, as 
well as invest $117 million a year in the development 
of cross-border transmission capacity. These higher 
investments of $279 million a year are more than 
compensated by reduced variables costs of $714 
million a year, essentially the annual reduction in the 
fuel bill associated with reduced reliance on thermal 
generating plant. The net savings are hence $435 
million each year.  
To make trade expansion possible, significant 
additional investments would be required. In particular, 
Guinea would need to develop 3,700 megawatts of additional hydropower capacity that would be 
dedicated to supplying export markets in neighboring countries. Almost all countries in the WAPP region 
would need to invest significantly in developing a total of 11,250 megawatts of new cross-border 
interconnectors to allow power to flow more readily around the region (table 3.4). The heaviest 
transmission investments would have to be made in Côte d‘Ivoire, Guinea, and Mali, each of which needs 
to develop more than 2,000 megawatts of cross-border interconnectors. 
The WAPP region as a whole would need to spend about 4.2 percent of its GDP to meet power needs, 
and most countries stand to save money by deepening regional trade. The spending needs identified in 
table 3.3 would absorb between 4.2 and 4.4 percent of the WAPP region‘s GDP, depending on whether 
the trade stagnation or trade expansion scenario is adopted (figure 3.2). For individual countries, the 
impact of adopting trade can substantially influence the burden of power sector development needs on 
their national economies.  
Table 3.3 Annualized costs of system expansion in 






Generation      
Investment cost  3,365  3,527 
Refurbishment cost  258  258 
Variable cost (fuel, O&M)  3,442  2,728 
T&D and connection       
Investment cost  3,584  3,701 
- Cross-border  0  117 
- Domestic  3,584  3,584 
Refurbishment cost  752  752 
Variable cost  1,320  1,320 
Total       
Capital cost  7,959  8,238 
- Investment cost  6,949  7,228 
- Refurbishment cost  1,010  1,010 
Variable cost  4,763  4,049 
 WAPP  12,722  12,287 
Source: Rosnes and Vennemo 2009. ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Under trade stagnation, seven WAPP countries (The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, and Togo) would need to spend more than 5 
percent of their GDP for a decade to meet the region‘s 
power sector needs, which is an extremely tall order. 
And, in the most extreme case, Liberia would need to 
spend almost 30 percent of its GDP to satisfy power 
demand.  
Under trade expansion, the pattern of spending shifts 
markedly. Most countries would spend substantially less 
to meet their power sector needs than under trade 
stagnation. Only three countries would need to spend 
significantly more than 5 percent of GDP (The Gambia, 
Guinea, and Senegal). However, the expenditure burden 
for Guinea would rise dramatically from around 4 
percent of GDP under trade stagnation to more than 20 
percent of GDP under trade expansion. This reflects the 
important role that Guinea would assume as an exporter 
of hydropower for the region. 
In 2005, power trade flows in the WAPP were 
limited to 5.3 terawatt-hours in total—about 17 percent 
of demand. Although WAPP is the second most active regional power pool in Africa after SAPP, the 
volumes of power involved are relatively small. The main flows involve imports by Benin, Togo, and 
Burkina Faso of power from Côte d‘Ivoire and Ghana, while Niger buys from Nigeria (figure 3.3a).  
Under trade stagnation, future trade volumes would increase to 15.5 terawatt-hours per year up to 
2015, and the pattern of trade would shift somewhat. If future trade is constrained by existing cross-
border transmission capacity, the overall volume rises only marginally to 10.2 terawatt hours per year. 
The most notable change would be the fact that Ghana could switch from being a net exporter to a net 
importer, leaving Côte d‗Ivoire as the main power exporter in the region (figures 3.3b, 3.4b). 
Under trade expansion, the volume of power traded within WAPP could increase substantially to 101 
terawatt-hours by 2015. The key change under trade expansion is that Guinea would fully develop its 
hydropower potential and become the major power exporter of the region, sending 17 terawatt-hours 
annually into neighboring countries and exporting more than five times its domestic consumption (figures 
3.3b, 3.4a). As a result, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, which currently do not import any 
power, would become significant importers. Mali‘s imports would also expand considerably. The role of 
Côte d‘Ivoire as a regional power exporter would be substantially reduced, and Ghana would become 
even more reliant on power imports. 
 
Table 3.4  Additional infrastructure requirements 






Benin   160  0 
Burkina Faso   0  0 
Côte d‘Ivoire   2,226  0 
Gambia   19  0 
Ghana   979  0 
Guinea   2,283  3,711 
Guinea Bissau   818  0 
Liberia   258  0 
Mali   2,703  0 
Mauritania   79  0 
Niger   206  0 
Nigeria   366  0 
Senegal   487  29 
Sierra Leone   661  0 
Togo   5  18 
Total  11,250  3,758 
Source: Derived from Rosnes and Vennemo 2009. ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Figure 3.2  Regional spending needs as a percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Derived from Rosnes and Vennemo 2009. 
 
Figure 3.3  Existing and simulated patterns of power trade in WAPP 
a. Existing flows (2005, TWh) 




b. Simulated flows (2015, TWh) 
 
Source: Derived from Rosnes and Vennemo 2009. 
Figure 3.4  Trade flows in WAPP in 2015 (TWh) 
 a. Trade expansion  b. Trade stagnation 
 
Source: Rosnes and Vennemo 2009. 
 
Under the trade expansion scenario, most WAPP countries would end up importing more than half of 
their power needs. Figure 3.5 presents the net trade flows between countries under the trade stagnation 
and trade expansion scenarios. It is evident that under trade expansion most countries become very 
heavily reliant on power imports to cover much of their power demand. At one extreme, countries such as 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, and Niger would import more than 80 percent of their power from ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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neighbors. A second group comprising Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, and Togo would 
also import a sizable share of their power consumption, ranging between 50 and 100 percent. With the 
exception of Niger, most of these importing countries would be relying almost exclusively on Guinea for 
their imports. 
Figure 3.5  Net imports as a share of domestic demand (percentage) 
 
Source: Derived from Rosnes and Vennemo 2009. 
 
The possibility of accelerating regional power trade in WAPP depends critically on the ability of 
Guinea to deliver the massive investments in hydropower that would be needed. The implementation of 
the trade expansion scenario here described essentially hinges on the rapid development of 3,700 
megawatts of additional hydropower resources in Guinea. There are a host of technical, financial, and 
political challenges that make this a difficult prospect. First, from a technical perspective, the envisaged 
scale-up is more than 30 times Guinea‘s existing installed generation capacity, which amounts to little 
more than 100 megawatts—a huge technical challenge for the country. Second, the cost of developing 
these hydropower schemes would be $786 million annually for a decade, equivalent to almost a quarter of 
Guinea‘s GDP, and would not be financially tenable for the country without massive capital contributions 
from the countries that would ultimately import the power. Third, for many years Guinea has suffered 
from political instability and weak governance, which do not make it an attractive destination for 
investments of this magnitude. 
In the absence of Guinea‘s hydropower, regional trade in WAPP would look very different, revolving 
largely around the role of Côte d‘Ivoire. To illustrate the sensitivity of WAPP‘s trading outcomes to the 
situation in Guinea, an additional illustrative scenario can be explored, one in which Guinea is unable to 
develop its hydropower export potential. In this case, Côte d‘Ivoire emerges as the major power exporter 
in the region, and Ghana increases domestic production considerably to reduce net imports. Mauritania 
and Sierra Leone are also net exporters of power, while Guinea itself becomes a power importer. Relative 
to the trade expansion scenario, annualized power system costs in WAPP increase by only 3 percent as 
the balance of costs shifts away from investment and toward operational expenditures.  ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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It is striking that under almost any scenario, Nigeria—by far the largest power producer and 
consumer in the region—hardly participates in the trading process. Nigeria already accounts for 53 
percent of all power consumption in the WAPP region, and this share is projected to increase to 65 
percent by 2015. Notwithstanding Nigeria‘s weight in the region as a whole, the economics of power 
trade in WAPP are such that Nigeria does not emerge either as a major importer or exporter of power 
under any trading scenario, but simply retains its role as a supplier of Niger and possibly begins to export 
modest amounts of power to Benin. Essentially, Nigeria seems to have a clear comparative advantage in 
meeting its own domestic power needs through its own hydropower and natural gas resources and would 
not find it attractive to import power from neighboring WAPP countries under any of the scenarios that 
can be envisaged. This is in contrast to other power pools, such as SAPP and EAPP/NB, where the major 
power consumer in each region—South Africa and the Arab Republic of Egypt respectively—acts as a 
major importer of power and anchor client for overall regional trading arrangements. 
By increasing the hydropower share in the regional generation portfolio, the trade expansion scenario 
would lead to annual savings in emissions of some five million tonnes of carbon. The main impact of 
trade expansion would be to make possible a shift away from thermal generation and relatively dispersed 
small-scale hydropower, toward larger and more cost-effective hydropower resources. Overall, the weight 
of hydropower in the regional generation portfolio would increase from 73 to 77 percent, with natural gas 
(and to a lesser extent diesel) being displaced (figure 3.6). Some 11.5 terawatt-hours of additional 
hydropower generation would take place, thereby reducing carbon emissions by 5.2 million tons 
(table 3.5). The savings in carbon emissions, although not insignificant, are low compared to those that 
would be possible in other regional power pools, where trade would permit a much larger volume of 
hydropower to be harnessed. 
Figure 3.6  Power generation mix 






Hydro Coal Gas Other
 
Source: Derived from Rosnes and Vennemo 2009. 
 
Beyond the financial savings reported above, deepening regional power trade would bring 
substantial economic benefits to the region by reducing the long-run marginal cost of power by 5 
percent overall. Given that power is a key production input to the economy, any reduction in this 
reference level of power costs will have an important knock-on effect in terms of productivity ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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and competitiveness. For WAPP as a whole, trade expansion would reduce the long-run marginal 
cost of power from $0.19 to $0.18 per kilowatt-hour, a reduction of 5 percent.  
 
Table 3.5  Differences in electricity production and CO2 emissions under power trade scenarios 
   WAPP  SAPP  EAPP  CAPP  Total  WAPP  SAPP  EAPP  CAPP  Total 
Production difference (TWh)  Emissions savings (millions of tonnes) 
Coal    –41.5  0.7    –40.8    –37.8  0.6    –37.2 
Diesel  –0.8  –0.3  0.3    –0.8  –0.6  –0.2  0.2    –0.6 
Gas  –9.2  –5.3  –42.4    –56.8  –4.7  –2.7  –21.5    –28.9 
HFO  0.2    0.4  –4.9  –4.3  0.1    0.3  –3.6  –3.2 
Hydro  11.5  47.5  43.4  5.1  107          0 
Total  1.6  0.5  2.4  0.3  4.7  –5.2  –40.7  –20.4  –3.6  –69.9 
 
 It should be noted that with or 
without trade, the economic cost of 
power in West Africa remains by far 
the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Moreover, the benefits of power trade 
in the region, though significant, are 
not as large as those found in the 
CAPP and SAPP areas (table 3.5).  
The magnitude of power cost 
savings varies hugely across 
individual countries in the WAPP 
area (table 3.6). Small countries that 
have traditionally relied on very 
expensive small-scale oil-based 
generation would gain the most if 
they were able to import hydropower 
from Guinea. In particular, countries 
such as Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, 
and Niger could save between $0.03 
and $0.07 per kilowatt-hour, a 
percentage reduction in power costs 
of between11 and 44 percent. Even in 
countries where savings appear more 
modest—on the order of $0.01 per 
kilowatt-hour—the aggregate value 
of these savings can be quite significant. Finally, Guinea the major power exporter under trade expansion, 
would face an increase in long-run marginal costs due to the need to develop a much larger amount of 
power, and hence more expensive schemes than those that would be strictly necessary to meet domestic 
demands alone. 










to trade (%) 
CAPP  7  9  –2  –22 
EAPP   12  12  0  0 
SAPP   6  7  –1  –14 
WAPP   18  19  –1  –5 
Benin  19  19  0  0 
Burkina Faso  25  26  –1  –4 
Côte d‘Ivoire  15  15  0  0 
Gambia  8  7  1  14 
Ghana  10  10  0  0 
Guinea  7  6  1  17 
Guinea-Bissau  9  16  –7  –44 
Liberia  8  14  –6  –43 
Mali  25  28  –3  –11 
Mauritania  14  15  –1  –7 
Niger  25  30  –5  –17 
Nigeria  13  13  0  0 
Senegal  43  47  –4  –9 
Sierra Leone  9  10  –1  –10 
Togo  10  11  –1  –9 
Source: Rosnes and Vennemo 2009. ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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The overall rate of return 
on power trade for power 
exporters in WAPP is 18 
percent; for importers, 1 
percent. For the WAPP 
exporters as a whole, regional 
power trade represents a gain 
of 18 percent annually for a 
one-time investment of $8.1 
billion over 10 years in 
interconnection and additional 
hydropower capacity. For 
importers, a one-time 
investment of $580 million 
over a decade produces a 
return of 1 percent annually 
(table 3.7). The overall rate of 
return on the investment for 
WAPP as a whole is 33 
percent. While this is a good 
rate of return, it is substantially 
lower than the returns to trade 
in other power pools, notably 
SAPP, which stands to make a 
return of 168 percent on power 
trade due to the exceptionally 
cost-effective hydropower resources available in Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Individual countries stand to make higher returns. For power importers, the trading decision can be 
thought of as an investment in cross-border interconnection that yields an annual return in terms of access 
to lower-cost power. On this basis, it is possible to calculate returns to trade for individual importers. 
Burkina Faso and Togo stand to make exceptionally high returns, while Liberia, Niger, and Senegal make 
a solid 30 percent return on such investments. Returns for other importers are much lower due to the high 
cost of interconnectors. For power exporters, the trading decision can be thought of as an investment in 
additional generation capacity and cross-border interconnection that yields an annual return in terms of 
revenues from power export. For example, Guinea could expect to make annual export revenues of $1.4 
billion on a one-time investment of $7.9 billion, yielding a rate of return of 19 percent. 
 
 














(TWh)  (US$m)  (%) 
Exporters                
Côte d‘ Ivoire  0.06  0.9  64.8  270  24 
Guinea  0.05  17.4  1,044  7,860  13 
Importers                
Burkina Faso  0.01  1.5  15  0  n.a. 
Togo  0.01  1.5  15  0  n.a. 
Niger  0.05  1.2  60  0  n.a. 
Benin  < 0.01  1.7  0  0  n.a. 
Ghana  < 0.01  12.8  0  50  n.a. 
Mauritania  0.01  0.8  8  100  8 
Sierra Leone  0.01  1  10  70  14 
Mali  0.03  1.8  54  260  21 
Guinea Bissau  0.07  0.2  14  50  28 
Liberia  0.06  1.3  78  20  390 
Senegal  0.04  3.5  140  30  467 
WAPP (exporters)     20.4  1462  8150  18 
WAPP (importers)     27.3  394  580  1 
Source: AICD calculations. 
Note: n.a. = not applicable. 
  
 
4    Information and communication technologies  




Compared with other regional economic communities, ECOWAS performs relatively well on access 
to information and communication technology but faces relatively high prices for critical ICT services. 
International bandwidth, at 16 bits per capita, and mobile subscriptions, at 25 per 100 inhabitants, are the 
second-highest in Sub-Saharan Africa after the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
Overall, however, broadband access rates and Internet subscriptions in ECOWAS are very low compared 
with SADC. High tariffs may provide part of the explanation for that difference. At $14, the price of a 
monthly prepaid mobile basket is higher than in any other region except CEMAC, while the average price 
for monthly Internet access, at $80, is exceeded only by EAC. On the other hand, prices of international 
telephone calls and fixed-line telephone service are relatively low (table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1  Benchmarking ICT infrastructure across regional communities 
   ECOWAS  CEMAC  COMESA  EAC  SADC 
Broadband subscribers (per 100 inhabitants)  0.03  0.01  0.04  0.02  0.36 
International Internet bandwidth (per capita)  16  11  9  11  19 
Internet subscribers (per 100 inhabitants)  0.24  0.06  0.09  0.05  0.53 
Main telephone lines outside largest city (per 100 inhabitants)  0.39  0.20  0.53  0.24  1.89 
Mobile telephone subscribers (per 100 inhabitants)  25  22  12  21  31 
           
Prepaid mobile price basket (US$ per month)  14.04  15.11  9.09  12.18  11.32 
Price of a three-minute call to United States (US$)  0.83  5.68  2.20  1.37  1.50 
Price of 20-hour Internet basket (US$ per month)  79.98  67.97  50.91  95.70  75.60 
Price of fixed telephone price basket (US$ per month)  9.35  12.59  6.85  13.33  13.27 
Source: Ampah and others 2009. 
Note: CEMAC = Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa; COMESA = Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; EAC = 
East African Community; SADC = Southern African Development Community. 
 
ICT access and prices at the regional level mask significant variations (table 4.2). Broadly speaking 
there are two groups of countries within the ECOWAS area. The first group—comprising Cape Verde, 
Côte d‘Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal—have relatively high mobile penetration (generally in excess 
of 30 subscribers per 100 population), mobile footprint (generally in excess of 70 percent of the 
population), and international bandwidth (generally above 40 bits per capita). A second group—
comprising the remaining countries—has substantially worse access indicators across the board, with 
mobile penetration generally below 20, a mobile footprint generally below 60 percent of the population, 
and international bandwidth generally below 20 bits per capita. Pricing structures also vary substantially, 
though not systematically across the two groups, with the price of a prepaid monthly basket varying from 
$4 in Guinea to $20 in Sierra Leone.  
As far as fixed-line international calls are concerned, it is somewhat cheaper to call within ECOWAS 
than to other parts of Africa, but still expensive in absolute terms. International fixed-line calls within 
ECOWAS, at around $0.73 per minute, are much cheaper than calls from ECOWAS member states to 
other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (around $0.92 per minute) (figure 4.2), except in the Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS).
4 Nevertheless, the range is huge, with an intra-ECOWAS 
call costing around $ 0.26 in Côte d‘Ivoire and $1.20 in Cape Verde, which is geographically isolated 
from the rest of the ECOWAS members. In Côte d‘Ivoire and Ghana, it is cheaper to call the United 
States than it is to call within the community. Ghanaians pay about $0.12 per minute to call the United 
States—the lowest such rate in the region; but to call another ECOWAS member state they pay three 
times more than their neighbors. 
                                                 
4 The member states of ECCAS are Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of 
Congo, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe.  
A subgroup of these countries forms the CEMAC (Economic Community of Central African States) countries, 
composed of Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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100 inhabitants)  0.02  0.01  0.78  0.11  0.02  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.34  0.00  0.08 
Coverage of 
mobile network 




capita)  17.2  16.4  49.5  42.0  19.9  21.2  0.3  1.2  0.1  12.2  2.4  4.6  151.7  0.1  28.1 
Internet 
subscribers (per 
100 inhabitants)  0.10  0.14  1.54  0.08  0.28  0.15  0.13  0.04    0.13  0.03  0.34  0.28  0.02  0.26 
Mobile telephone 
subscribers (per 
100 inhabitants)  20.1  10.9  31.0  36.6  33.4  32.4  14.6  19.2  15.0  20.5  6.3  26.5  36.8  13.2  18.1 
Price of a three-
minute call to 
United States 
(US$)  1.06  1.22  3.61  0.91  1.85  0.44  4.61      1.73  1.93  0.28  1.03    2.43 
Price of the 
fixed-line 
monthly phone 
basket (US$)  5.34  12.00  8.02  25.02  4.00  6.33  7.10      11.01  12.64  7.39  10.48  2.11  13.86 
Prepaid mobile 
monthly basket 
(US$)  10.4  15.5  12.9  12.9  6.9  5.7  3.8  11.3    14.7  15.0  16.3  9.1  19.4  16.0 
Price of 20- hour 
Internet basket  
(US$)  43.1  75.0  44.2  47.8  17.8  9.4  26.8  74.9    28.4  51.2  118.9  25.8  9.9  20.3 
Source: Ampah and others 2009. 
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Figure 4.2  Price of one-minute peak-rate call within and outside regional community (US$)  
 
Source: Ampah and others 2009. 
Note: ECCAS = Economic Community of Central African States; COMESA = Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; SADC = 
Southern African Development Community. 
 
Perhaps more relevant than fixed-line international calls are regional roaming arrangements for 
mobile services—and this is an area where ECOWAS is relatively advanced. Given that fixed-line 
services have largely been overtaken by mobile services in West Africa, the regional availability of 
roaming arrangements on mobile tariffs is in many ways a more relevant measure of the cost of internal 
communications. Compared to other regional communities, ECOWAS has made significant progress in 
promoting roaming through special intra-operator arrangements. Subscribers who belong to one of these 
networks can use their mobile handset in the other countries, where they do not pay for incoming calls 
and are charged local rates for outgoing calls. Prepaid users can also add time to their phones in the 
country in which they are roaming. Subscribers who do not belong to specific networks can still use their 
mobile phones in other ECOWAS countries as long as there is a roaming agreement with the operator in 
the country in which they are roaming. However, they will not benefit from the preferential tariff rates 
and features of the interoperator roaming schemes, and hence will have to pay to receive incoming calls 
and pay a surcharge on outgoing calls. Some operators offer roaming only for postpaid subscribers. Only 
Côte d‘Ivoire and Senegal have roaming agreements with every ECOWAS country. Cape Verde has the 
fewest roaming agreements within the region, a reflection of its geographical and linguistic isolation 
(table 4.3). ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Benin    *     *      *  *   *  *  * 
Burkina Faso  *    *  *  *     *  *  *    *   * 
Cape Verde  PO  PO    PO  PO  PO        PO  PO  PO  PO    PO 
Côte d'Ivoire                
Gambia  PO  PO  PO  PO    PO      PO  PO  PO  PO  PO  PO  PO 
Ghana       PP       PP    PP   PP 
Guinea   *     *           *   
Guinea-Bissau     *   *              
Liberia        *                 
Mali  PP  PP     PP  PP         PO   PO  PP 
Niger  *      *             
Nigeria       PO      PO     PO   PO 
Senegal  PP  PP  PO   PP  PO    PO    PP    PO  PP 
Sierra Leone  *   *  *  *   *    *  *   *  *    * 
Togo  PO  PO    PO    PO        PO    PO  PO     
                               
ONE (Zain)                           
Orange Zone                         
One World (MTN)                         
                        
Note: * Not specified if postpaid only. PO=Postpaid only. PP=Prepaid and postpaid.  
Source: Derived from Ampah and others 2009. 
 
Two factors explain the relatively advanced state of regional integration with regard to mobile 
roaming arrangements. One is the existence of a proactive regional regulatory association for ICT. The 
other is the existence of a number of large mobile operators with presence across multiple ECOWAS 
countries.  
ECOWAS and its regional telecom regulator have been particularly active in promoting regulatory 
harmonization of the ICT sector. Through a commissioner for infrastructure and a Department of 
Transport and Telecommunications, ECOWAS promotes key objectives in the telecommunications 
sector, such as establishing a single liberalized market, harmonizing laws and regulations, coordinating 
and integrating regional infrastructure projects, and enhancing GSM in the region. The national members 
of the West Africa Telecommunications Regulators Association (WATRA) communicate regularly to 
keep abreast of telecom issues in the region and share information. The existence of this relatively 
developed institutional structure has helped to facilitate the roaming arrangements that are observed in the 
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Several large mobile groups with a multicountry presence dominate the regional telecommunications 
market. Across the board, ECOWAS member states have been very open to foreign investment in mobile 
telecommunications, with most countries having two or three foreign operators (table 4.4). In particular, 
seven major mobile operators—Etisalat, France Telecom, Maroc Telecom, Millicom, MTC (Zain), MTN, 
and Comium—have established a significant presence in the region, each covering between two and 
seven countries. Both France Telecom and French Vivendi channel their West African investments 
through local subsidiaries (Sonatel of Senegal and Maroc Telecom respectively), with the public-service 
philosophy of the subsidiaries sometimes guiding strategy and policy. These multicountry networks 
underpin the regional roaming arrangements detailed above, which essentially collapse into three roaming 
areas: Orange Zone, Zain One, and One World (table 4.5). 
















































































































































Benin  51%              75%     1  3  Globacom (Nigeria) 
Burkina Faso  51%     51%     100%           3    
Cape Verde                       2  2  Portugal Telecom (40%) 
Teylium (Côte d'Ivoire) (70%) 
Côte d'Ivoire  —  85%           65%  —  1  5  Warid (UAE) 
Gambia                    —     3  Other=Lintel (Lebanon, 100%) 
Ghana           100%  75%  98%     2  5  Globacom (Nigeria) 
Vodafone (UK) (70%) 
Guinea     38%           75%     2  4  Teylium (Côte d'Ivoire) 
 Cellcom (U.S.) 
Guinea 
Bissau 
   42%           100%        2    
Liberia                 60%  —  1  3  Cellcom (U.S.) 
Mali     30%  51%                 2    
Niger  57%  80%        90%        —  4  Other=ZTE (China) and LAP 
(Libya) 
Nigeria  40%           66%  76%        3    
Senegal     42%     100%              3   Sudatel (Sudan) (100%) 
Sierra Leone              100%     —  —  2  Other: Lintel (Lebanon, 100%) 
Togo  —                       1    
TOTAL  6  6  2  2  5  7  4       
Source: Derived from Ampah and others 2009. 
— = Data not available.  
 




Table 4.5  Regional roaming networks within ECOWAS 
Source: Derived from Ampah and others 2009. 
 
ECOWAS has several submarine fiber optic cables. The main international cable in the region is the 
South Atlantic 3 (SAT-3)/WASC, which extends from Malaysia to South Africa and then up the West 
Coast of Africa to Portugal and Spain. In addition, the Atlantis-2 cable runs from South America to Cape 
Verde and Senegal and then up to Portugal and Spain. The 9,800-kilometer Glo-1 cable was launched in 
September 2009 with a landing station in Nigeria. It will connect several other West African countries 
with onward extensions to London and New York.
5 
Several additional undersea cables are planned, so that by the year 2012 West Africa will likely be 
served by at least five submarine cables (4.3). For example, the planned Africa Coast to Europe (ACE) 
cable,
6 which will run from France to Gabon, is expected to be operational by 2011. Seventeen operators 
signed the memorandum of understanding in November 2008. ACE will connect all countries along the 
west coast of Africa, from Morocco to South Africa (more than 25 countries in Africa and Western 
Europe).
7 The 14,000-kilometer Main One cable system is expected to connect Africa with Europe, the 
Americas, and Asia in 2010. The initial deployment will connect Portugal to Nigeria, with a landing 
station in Ghana. After this is complete, the network will be expanded to connect South Africa, Angola, 
Gabon, Senegal, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d‘Ivoire, and Morocco.
8 The West African Cable 
System (WACS) will link Europe, West Africa and South Africa. The WACS consortium has 11 
operators from 9 countries.
9 
Nevertheless, quite a few countries are unconnected to the submarine cables, and the intraregional 
backbone remains incomplete. At present, only five coastal ECOWAS countries have landing stations for 
SAT3—Benin, Côte d‘Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal. The other coastal countries are completely 
bypassed at present. Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone lack terrestrial fiber optic connections with the 
regional network that might provide at least some form of indirect access. The landlocked countries also 
remain unconnected, although new infrastructure is already underway. The planned ACE cable includes 
landing stations for the Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, and Togo. In addition, it will 
increase competition in the countries that already have access to submarine infrastructure by providing an 
alternative route for traffic.  




8 http://www.mainonecable.com  
9 http://allafrica.com/stories/200910270242.html 
Network  Countries 
Orange Zone  Available for subscribers in Côte d‘Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, and Senegal 
Zain One  Available for subscribers in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone 
One World of MTN  Available for subscribers in Benin, Côte d‘Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Nigeria. ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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The European Union is funding an ECOWAS study of the feasibility of developing regional 
backbones to connect the region‘s fragile and postconflict countries (Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone) to the SAT3/WASC submarine cable network. Another regional connectivity project aims 
to leverage the unused fiber optic installed in electric utility power lines. That project is ongoing in 
collaboration with the West Africa Power Pool and the association of the region‘s electrical utilities. 
Figure 4.3  Proposed fiber optic connectivity in ECOWAS 
 
Source: Mayer and others 2009. 
 
Even where submarine connections exist, costs remain relatively high owing to a lack of competition 
in the international gateways (table 4.6). The cost of calling countries within Africa is lower in countries 
that are connected to submarine cable. Countries with competitive international gateways pay 
significantly less to call within Africa and to the United States than those with monopolistic international 
gateways. But price variations in competitive gateways are often defined by subtle details of the legal 
situation. Despite competitive gateways, in some ECOWAS countries, the price of the 20-hour 
connectivity to the Internet is not lower than in countries without competitive gateways. In Nigeria, for 
example, where Internet service providers can provide their own satellite connectivity, NITEL (the ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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incumbent) has had a monopoly over the landing station and has not offered cost-based wholesale rates to 
the ISPs to connect to SAT3. The high prices reflect the monopoly over the landing station. In contrast, 
Senegal which has a monopoly with a social orientation in the international gateway, has lower prices 
than Nigeria.  
To attain connectivity 
between all capital cities in the 
the region, ECOWAS member 
countries will have to add 1905 
kilometers of new fiber optic 
links. Achieving the minimum 
levels of regional connectivity 
will require investments in 
several countries. The levels of 
investment required in each case 
are very modest in absolute 
terms (table 4.7). 
In addition to the cost of achieving intraregional connectivity, 
the ECOWAS region, combined with Central African countries, 
will have to spend $1 billion to install the Infinity, GLO-1, and 
WAFS systems needed to provide intercontinental connectivity 
(table 4.8). While this investment is larger than that required in 
any other regional community, the bulk of the investment relates 
to submarine cables and will be funded by the private sector.  
The benefits of completing regional integration of ICT 
networks would be substantial in relation to the modest costs. 
Experience from other African countries, suggests that 
connecting a country to a submarine cable via a competitive 
arrangement for landing stations can bring down the costs of 
broadband Internet by as much as 75 percent (box 4.1). Not only 
would this bring substantial savings to existing users of 
broadband, but the substantial price reduction could be expected 
to induce additional uptake of service. The overall benefits of 
completing the regional integration agenda can be estimated to be $120 million per year for ECOWAS, 
compared with costs of only $51 million to complete the backbone connectivity. This investment leads to 
an attractive rate of return of 235 percent for the regional community as a whole (table 4.9). The bulk of 
the benefits derive from the addition of new broadband users, making regional integration a positive 
business prospect for broadband service providers. 
 
Table 4.6  Prices of Internet and phone calls in Sub-Saharan Africa, with and 
without access to submarine cables 
  
Price per 




minute for a call 
to United 
States (US$) 
Price for 20 
hours of dial-up 
Internet access 
per month ($) 
No access to submarine cable  1.34  0.86  67.95 
Access to submarine cable  0.57  0.48  47.28 
Monopoly international gateway  0.7  0.72  37.36 
Competitive international gateway  0.48  0.23  36.62 
Source: AICD calculations 
Table 4.7  Gaps in intraregional 
connectivity and total investment 
required to attain minimum levels of 
regional connectivity 
Country  Gaps(km)  Cost 
Burkina Faso  218  6 
Côte d'Ivoire  93  3 
Ghana  210  6 
Guinea  288  8 
Guinea Bissau  113  3 
Liberia  382  10 
Niger  75  2 
Nigeria  200  5 
Sierra Leone  326  9 
Total  1905  51 




A number of greenfield investments 
have been made to develop the 
communications backbone in several 
countries. A one-time investment in 
Senegal is resulting in a 34 percent rate of 
return annually. In several other countries 
such as Burkina Faso, Niger, and Nigeria, 
the greenfiled invesments that are in place 
have had an impressive rate of return. Yet 
when the gaps in the backbone and 
connectivity are bridged, the rate of return 
will escalate. For example, in Burkina 
Faso, a $6 million investment to address ICT gaps will lead to a 56 percent rate of return on this 
investment annually (table 4.9). 




Monthly benefit  
(US$ millions) 
Investment need  
(US$ millions)  Rate of return (%) 
   Before  After  Before  After  Greenfield 
Remaining 
gap  Greenfield 
Remaining 
gap 
Benin  2.7  7.4  0.12  0.10  2.0     134    
Burkina Faso  4.5  11.5  0.15  0.12  19.6  5.9  17  56 
Cape Verde  7.4  8.3  0.10  0.01  0.0          
Côte d'Ivoire  10.0  74.8  0.17  0.54  27.1  2.5  31  337 
Gambia  0.3  1.4  0.01  0.01  5.2     5    
Ghana  23.0  55.9  0.38  0.27  8.1  5.7  97  139 
Guinea    …  0.00  0.00  7.7  7.8       
Guinea-
Bissau  -  0.3  0.00  0.00  4.9  3.1       
Liberia  ...  0.5  0.00  0.00  10.6  10.3       
Mali  5.3  20.4  0.11  0.16  26.3     12    
Niger  0.6  2.3  0.06  0.09  11.6  2.0  15  86 
Nigeria  67.8  258.0  2.67  3.74  59.3  5.4  130  1,425 
Senegal  47.4  49.2  0.71  0.01  25.6     34    
Sierra Leone    1.4  0.00  0.00  8.8  8.8       
Togo  1.9  1.8  0.13  0.00  4.4     36    
 
Table 4.8  Intercontinental and intraregional spending needs for 
ECOWAS for 10 years 
   Intercontinental connectivity 




East Africa   EASSy, TEAMS  260 
Southern Africa   Infraco, SRII  510 
Central Africa   Infinity, GLO-1, 
WAFS  1,010 
West Africa  
Total, Sub-Saharan Africa     1,780 
Source: Mayer and others 2009. ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Box 4.1  Methodology for calculating benefits of ICT 
Affordability significantly affects access to telecommunications services. As the price of broadband service rises, 
the number of fixed broadband subscribers per 100 inhabitants drops (see figure). 
Relation between broadband penetration and broadband affordability, world 
 
 
The cost of Internet access largely depends on the wholesale price paid for international Internet connectivity. 
Presently, African countries rely heavily on satellite connections for Internet access. But fiber optic cable can lower 
the cost of Internet access provided countries allow Internet service providers (ISPs) open access to the cable. For 
example, in Kenya, connectivity to the fiber optic cable produced a 75 percent drop in international bandwidth 
prices. 
Assuming Kenya‘s wholesale cost reduction were applicable to other countries and that international wholesale 
prices account for half of the ISPs‘ cost structure, the reduction in retail prices is assumed to be 37.5 percent. The 
potential savings for consumers in African countries, once they have open access to undersea fiber optic networks, 
can then be estimated. The revised broadband tariff is used to estimate the number of new broadband subscriptions 
based on the equation shown in the figure. Based on these assumptions, it is estimated that a 37.5 percent reduction 
in retail broadband prices would result in a consumer savings of $159 million for existing subscribers. The lower 
broadband prices would trigger new subscriptions estimated at around 2.7 million (compared with 833,000 in 2008). 
These new subscriptions would generate an additional $800 million of new revenue.  
Certain assumptions in the model should be noted. The model assumes a standard broadband tariff, even though 
there are a number of different packages depending on speed. It assumes a scenario similar to Kenya‘s in terms of 
the degree of the price reduction, and that half of the wholesale price reduction will be passed through to retail 
prices. It also assumes that there is a lone relationship between broadband pricing and take-up, even though other 
variables such as education and infrastructure availability will also have an impact. Finally, the model shows the 
one-off effect of a 37.5 percent reduction in retail tariffs. The timing of the full reduction is likely to spread over 






5    Regional infrastructure funding 
Completing and maintaining ECOWAS‘s regional infrastructure backbones would entail sustained 
annual spending of $1.5 billion dollars annually over the course of a decade. The preceding sections 
identified key gaps in ECOWAS‘s regional infrastructure backbone. A basic regional package that would 
complete the infrastructure required for full regional power trade, a complete regional road network, and 
fiber optic links connecting all countries to submarine cables would cost $1.6 billion annually if 
implemented over a decade. To put this in perspective, the total amount of annual infrastructure spending 
in the ECOWAS region to fulfill both regional and national infrastructure demands amounts to $27 
billion. Hence, the regional portion accounts for only 6 percent of the overall requirement.  
The amount of spending needed attain the basic levels of regional integration described in the 
preceding chapters varies hugely across countries and sectors (table 5.1). Looking across sectors, the 
largest spending requirements—in terms of investments, operations, and maintenance—are in power ($1 
billion annually), followed by transport ($375 million), and information and communication technology 
(ICT, $8 million). Guinea and Nigeria have the highest spending needs in the region in absolute terms. 
Guinea would have to spend $919 annually, mainly on power, to meet the regional spending needs for 
infrastructure. Nigeria needs to spend $232 million on regional integration, largely related to road 
investments and maintenance.  
Although the bulk of the regional infrastructure spending needs relate to new investment, there is also 
a significant ongoing need for maintenance spending. Maintaining ECOWAS‘s regional backbones, once 
completed, would cost a significant $458 million a year, most of it ($234 million) associated with 
maintenance of the regional road network.  
The burden of regional spending as a percentage of GDP varies by country and is daunting in the case 
of some countries (figure 5.1). Guinea Bissau, Liberia, and Guinea have the highest burden, expressed as 
a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). Guinea would have to spend almost 30 percent of its GDP 
to fulfill regional investment needs. Liberia and Guinea Bissau would have to spend more than 5 percent 
of GDP to fulfill regional spending needs. These levels of spending are far beyond what these small and 
fragile economies could reasonably sustain, making it unlikely that they would be able to deliver their 




Table 5.1  Regional spending needs by sector 
   Power  Transport  ICT  Total 







Benin        2  8        2  8  10 
Burkina Faso        3  15  0.59  0.03  4  15  19 
Cote d'Ivoire  27     3  18  0.25  0.01  31  18  48 
Gambia, The     7  1  1        1  8  9 
Ghana  5     9  20  0.31  0.02  14  20  34 
Guinea  786  80  28  24  0.78  0.04  815  104  919 
Guinea-Bissau  5     2  5  0.55  0.03  7  5  12 
Liberia  2     10  6  1.03  0.05  13  6  19 
Mali  26     24  16        50  16  66 
Mauritania  1     14  5        15  5  20 
Niger  1     9  18  2.36  0.12  12  18  30 
Nigeria  2  137  21  72  0.24  0.01  23  209  232 
Senegal  3     8  19        11  19  30 
Sierra Leone        7  5  0.88  0.04  8  5  13 
Togo        0  2        0  2  2 
ECOWAS  858  224  141  234  7  0.35  1,006  458  1,464 
Source: AICD calculations. 
*empty cells indicate that AICD does not estimate any spending for investment or maintenance of a specific sector 
 
Figure 5.1  Spending for regional infrastructure as a share of GDP 










































































Source: AICD calculations. 




To meet regional requirements several countries would need to devote around 10 percent of their 
existing infrastructure budgets to regional projects. Figure 5.2 expresses each country‘s regional spending 
requirement as a percentage of existing infrastructure spending. Information on existing spending is 
available only for a subset of countries. This analysis identifies a first group of countries (Benin, Cote d 
‘Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal, and Nigeria) that could meet their regional spending quotas by allocating less 
than 10 percent of their existing infrastructure spending to regional projects. However, there is a second 
group (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) that would need to devote 10–15 percent of their infrastructure 
spending to regional projects in order to meet their share of regional spending needs, which looks to be a 
much tougher proposition. 
Figure 5.2  Spending for regional infrastructure as a percentage of national infrastructure spending 
 
Source: AICD calculations. 




This country report draws upon a wide range of papers, databases, models, and maps that were 
created as part of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic. All of these can be downloaded from the 
project website: www.infrastructureafrica.org. For papers go to the document page 
(http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/documents), for databases to the data page 
(http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data), for models go to the models page 
(http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/models) and for maps to the map page 
(http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/maps ). The references for the papers that were used to 
compile this country report are provided in the table below. 
General 
Africa‘s Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation (AICD Web site), http://www.infrastructureafrica.org 
Foster, Vivien, and Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, eds. 2009. Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for 
Transformation. Paris and Washington, DC: Agence Française de Développement and World 
Bank.  
Financing 
Briceño-Garmendia, Cecilia, Karlis Smits, and Vivien Foster. 2009. ―Financing Public Infrastructure in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Patterns and Emerging Issues.‖ AICD Background Paper 15, Africa Region, 
World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Growth 
Calderón, César. 2009. ―Infrastructure and Growth in Africa,‖ Policy Research Working Paper 4914, 
World Bank, Washington, DC.  
Escribano, Alvaro, J. Luis Guasch, and Jorge Pena. 2010. ―Assessing the Impact of Infrastructure Quality 
on Firm Productivity in Africa.‖ Policy Research Working Paper 5191, World Bank, Washington, 
DC. 
Yepes, Tito, Justin Pierce, and Vivien Foster. 2009. ―Making Sense of Africa‘s Infrastructure 
Endowment: A Benchmarking Approach.‖ Policy Research Working Paper 4912, World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
Information and communication technologies 
Ampah, Mavis, Daniel Camos, Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, Michael Minges, Maria Shkaratan, and Mark 
Williams. 2009. ―Information and Communications Technology in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Sector 
Review.‖ AICD Background Paper 10, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC. ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Mayer, Rebecca, Ken Figueredo, Mike Jensen, Tim Kelly, Richard Green, and Alvaro Federico Barra. 
2009. ―Connecting the Continent: Costing the Needs for Spending on ICT Infrastructure in 
Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 3, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Irrigation 
Svendsen, Mark, Mandy Ewing, and Siwa Msangi. 2008. ―Watermarks: Indicators of Irrigation Sector 
Performance in Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 4, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, 
DC. 
You, L., C. Ringler, G. Nelson, U. Wood-Sichra, R. Robertson, S. Wood, G. Zhe, T. Zhu, and Y. Sun. 
2009. ―Torrents and Trickles: Irrigation Spending Needs in Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 9, 
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About AICD  
This study is a product of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD), a project designed to 
expand the world‘s knowledge of physical infrastructure in Africa. AICD provides a baseline against 
which future improvements in infrastructure services can be measured, making it possible to monitor the 
results achieved from donor support. It also offers a solid empirical foundation for prioritizing 
investments and designing policy reforms in Africa‘s infrastructure sectors.  
The AICD is based on an unprecedented effort to collect detailed economic and technical data on African 
infrastructure. The project has produced a series of original reports on public expenditure, spending 
needs, and sector performance in each of the main infrastructure sectors, including energy, information 
and communication technologies, irrigation, transport, and water and sanitation. Africa’s Infrastructure—
A Time for Transformation, published by the World Bank and the Agence Française de Développement in 
November 2009, synthesized the most significant findings of those reports.  
Reports on Africa‘s for major regional economic communities (RECs) provide a snapshot of the state of 
integration of infrastructure networks at the regional level. The focus of these reports is on benchmarking 
infrastructure performance within and between RECs, gauging the benefits of regional integration, 
identifying missing links, and quantifying the main financing gaps and their distribution across countries. 
These reports are particularly relevant to national and regional policy makers and development partners 
working on regional integration programs. 
The AICD was commissioned by the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa following the 2005 G8 (Group 
of Eight) summit at Gleneagles, Scotland, which flagged the importance of scaling up donor finance for 
infrastructure in support of Africa‘s development.  
The AICD‘s first phase focused on 24 countries that together account for 85 percent of the gross domestic 
product, population, and infrastructure aid flows of Sub-Saharan Africa. The countries are: Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d‘Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Under a second phase of the project, coverage was 
expanded to include as many as possible of the remaining African countries.  
Consistent with the genesis of the project, the main focus is on the 48 countries south of the Sahara that 
face the most severe infrastructure challenges. Some components of the study also cover North African 
countries so as to provide a broader point of reference. Unless otherwise stated, therefore, the term 
―Africa‖ is used throughout this report as a shorthand for ―Sub-Saharan Africa.‖ ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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The World Bank has implemented the AICD with the guidance of a steering committee that represents the 
African Union, the New Partnership for Africa‘s Development (NEPAD), Africa‘s regional economic 
communities, the African Development Bank, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, and major 
infrastructure donors.  
Financing for the AICD is provided by a multidonor trust fund to which the main contributors are the 
United Kingdom‘s Department for International Development, the Public Private Infrastructure Advisory 
Facility, Agence Française de Développement, the European Commission, and Germany‘s KfW 
Entwicklungsbank. The Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program and the Water and Sanitation 
Program provided technical support on data collection and analysis pertaining to their respective sectors. 
A group of distinguished peer reviewers from policy-making and academic circles in Africa and beyond 
reviewed all of the major outputs of the study to ensure the technical quality of the work. 
The data underlying the AICD‘s reports, as well as the reports themselves, are available to the public 
through an interactive Web site, www.infrastructureafrica.org, that allows users to download customized 
data reports and perform various simulations. Many AICD outputs will appear in the World Bank‘s 
Policy Research Working Papers series. 
Inquiries concerning the availability of data sets should be directed to the volume editors at the World 
Bank in Washington, DC. 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 